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Abstract
The division of resources between male and female reproductive function is defined as
sex allocation. The usefulness of simple rules to predict adaptive sex-allocation decisions
has been a contentious topic. Simple rules are difficult to apply when the biological details
of the life cycle are complex, as is the case in many vertebrates. We build a mathematical-
computational model to investigate the usefulness of a simple rule that predicts adaptive sex-
allocation decisions. We find that the simple rule is a better predictor of adaptive sex-allocation
decisions when more features of an organism’s life cycle are assumed to evolve. Even though
the simple rule is a useful heuristic for predicting adaptive sex-allocation decisions, we find that
its usefulness depends critically on the presence or absence of certain sex-specific asymmetries
in the life cycle. We find that magnifying the asymmetries captured by the simple rule improves
the usefulness of the simple rule.
Keywords: sex allocation, sex ratio, Trivers-Willard hypothesis, inclusive fitness, life his-
tory, reproductive value
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Chapter 1
Background and overview
Sex allocation is the division of resources, such as energy and parental care, between male and
female components of Darwinian fitness. This division of resources has a direct effect on the
ratio of males to females in a population, termed the sex ratio. Much theoretical research has
focused on developing simple rules to predict adaptive sex allocation and sex ratios.
Some of the first theoretical work on sex-allocation theory comes from Fisher (1930), who
outlined the situations in which a simple rule of equal allocation to male and female compo-
nents of fitness, modulo rates at which fitness returns are gained, might be considered adaptive
(i.e., there are equal numbers of males and females). To make this argument, Fisher introduced
a concept termed reproductive value, which measures how effective an individual will be at
passing on its genes to others in generations far into the future. He argued that, in diploids
(organisms with two sets of chromosomes), the total reproductive value of all male investment
equals that of all female investment. It follows that investment in the rarer sex will yield a
higher reproductive value payoff. Thus, selection will favour those who invest in the rarer
sex, and assuming returns on investment are realized at the same rate for males and females,
selection will stop when neither sex is rarer (i.e., equal investment). Fisher’s theory of equal
allocation in the sexes (i.e., one should always invest equally in the sexes) is a “simple rule”
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that can be used to predict adaptive sex-allocation decisions.
Fisher’s argument for the advantage of unbiased sex allocation made some tacit assump-
tions. When these assumptions are violated, new simple rules that predict sex-allocation deci-
sions are found. Both of the following theories relax Fisher’s tacit assumption of a well-mixed
population to show that sex ratios can be biased toward the sex that suffers less from com-
petition with same-sex relatives. In some organisms, such as fig wasps in the genus Idarnes,
differences in sex-specific morphology are associated with males competing for mates (Hamil-
ton, 1979). When males compete for mates, sex ratios are female biased and the associated
theory is referred to as local mate competition (LMC) (Hamilton, 1967). While studying the
galagid primate Galago crassicaudantus, Clark (1978) noticed that female kin were compet-
ing for reproductive resources and sex ratios were biased toward males. This led to the theory
known as local resource competition (LRC), which states that sex ratios are biased toward
males when females compete for reproductive resources. The results given by LMC and LRC
led to a different simple rule that predicts adaptive sex allocation in populations when Fisher’s
well-mixed assumption fails. This simple rule suggested that individuals should invest in the
more dispersive sex, according to Bulmer and Taylor (1980), or invest in the sex more likely
to compete for breeding opportunities on a non-natal territory, according to Wild and Taylor
(2004).
Trivers and Willard (1973) proposed another simple rule that predicts adaptive sex-allocation
decisions by relaxing Fisher’s tacit assumption that same-sex individuals are in the same con-
dition. They assumed that higher quality individuals provide a higher rate-of-return on in-
vestment. Their hypothesis, called the Trivers-Willard hypothesis (TWH), predicted that when
individual quality is heterogeneous, investment strategies should be biased toward the sex that
3receives a greater benefit for being higher quality. For example, if males or male function
yields higher returns on investment, then breeders in higher condition should invest in males
(or male reproductive function) and breeders in lower condition should invest in females (or
female reproductive function). The investment strategy predicted by the TWH is the result of a
direct incentive for high-quality breeders and a frequency-dependent incentive for low-quality
breeders. Empirical evidence for the TWH was found by Clutton-Brock et al. (1986) while
studying red deer (Cervus elaphus). Hewison and Gaillard (1999) conducted a review of em-
pirical studies that tested the TWH in ungulates. They found that while the TWH was able
to correctly predict allocation decisions in some species, such as the red deer (Clutton-Brock
et al., 1986) and the arrui (Ammotragus lervia) (Cassinello, 1996), the TWH was not able to
predict allocation decisions in other species, such as the horse (Equus caballus) (Monard et al.,
1997). Surprisingly, the conclusions of empirical studies that test the TWH in the same species
may not even agree (i.e., one study may conclude that the TWH was able to predict allocation
decisions and another concludes that the TWH was not able to predict allocation decisions).
This was the case in the reindeer (Rangifer tarandus) (Skogland, 1986; Kojola and Eloranta,
1989). Due to the mixed support of the TWH in vertebrates, the usefulness of this simple rule
when applied to organisms with more complex life histories is currently under debate.
The TWH has generated a lot of interest from biologists. Unfortunately, the TWH has
not been able to correctly predict adaptive sex-allocation decisions in some vertebrate species,
possibly due to non-homogeneity in parental quality accompanied by incomplete mixing. It is
for this reason that Wild and West (2007) sought to investigate the performance of simple rules
based on LMC and TWH when Fisher’s assumptions of homogeneity and complete mixing are
violated. They find that simple rules could fail in drastic and possibly unpredictable ways. The
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poor performance of simple rules in their model is underpinned by constrained dispersal. Wild
and Taylor (2004) allowed sex allocation and dispersal to coevolve ( i.e., the joint evolution
of multiple traits in a species) and found that simple rules like equal allocation are recovered.
Specifically, they showed that when there is an asymmetry in sex-specific dispersal rates, in-
dividuals prefer to invest in the sex that disperses more readily. This rule was not recovered
when dispersal rates were fixed. The result in Wild and Taylor (2004) suggests to us that fixing
dispersal may be the reason why simple rules, such as the TWH, cannot be easily applied to
models with more complex life histories, and in turn empirical studies of vertebrates. The first
goal of this work is to determine if the coevolution of sex allocation and dispersal is able to
restore the usefulness of simple rules when applied to vertebrates.
Models inspired by the TWH have assumed zero relatedness between individuals of differ-
ent quality. This assumption is the result of the chosen population structure: models assume
infinite islands; each island has homogeneous territory quality; individual quality is derived
from territory quality; due to the infinite island structure, individuals on different islands (of
potentially different quality) are unrelated (Leturque and Rousset, 2003; Wild and West, 2007).
However, in nature, when organisms use lek mating – males attempt to attract a female for a
breeding opportunity and then females raise the offspring elsewhere – zero relatedness between
individuals of different quality seems unlikely. For example, lek mating systems are found in
the black grouse (Tetrao tetrix) (Alatalo et al., 1992), and more interestingly in the kakapo
(Stringops habroptilus) (Sutherland, 2002) — a species in which the TWH can be applied. The
second goal of this work is to address the lack of sex-allocation theory when relatedness is
nonzero between individuals of different quality.
To achieve goal number one, we build a theoretical model to determine how altering a sex-
5allocation strategy changes the reproductive value of an individual’s genetic lineage, which is
that individual’s inclusive fitness (Taylor, 1990). Inclusive fitness is a measure of how effec-
tive an individual is at transmitting its genes, and identical copies of its genes, into the next
generation. Changes in inclusive fitness give us insight into the directional action of selection
for a given trait. We derive changes in inclusive fitness using an excellent modeling heuristic
provided by Taylor and Frank (1996).
Essentially, the method presented in Taylor and Frank (1996) is a perturbation analysis
around the zeroth-order case when no selection is present. They assumed that the expression
of a trait (e.g., sex allocation) is determined by an individual’s genes. Taylor and Frank (1996)
began with a population that has neutral genetic diversity and that had been allowed to reach
an equilibrium. Additionally, they assumed that when the expression of a trait is increased by
an allele, all identical by descent copies of that allele are also able to increase the expression
of that trait. Consequently, increasing the expression of a trait affects reproductive values.
Weighting the new reproductive values by a focal individual’s genetic contribution allows us to
approximate their change in inclusive fitness. The direction of evolution under natural selection
can be determined and an adaptive sex-allocation strategy can be predicted.
In Chapter 2, we investigate whether alleviating constraints on the evolution of dispersal
is able to restore the usefulness of simple rules that predict sex-allocation decisions. We in-
vestigate how sex-specific differences in the life history affect the predictive ability of a simple
rule based on the TWH. This is done for the case when all territories on an island are the
same quality, which addresses our first goal. Overall, we find that alleviating constraints on
the evolution of dispersal is able to restore the usefulness of this simple rule. We also find
that average population quality affects the usefulness of the simple rule in unexpected ways.
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Chapter 3 reiterates the findings of this thesis and suggests future projects that further investi-
gate how alleviating evolutionary constraints affects the usefulness of simple rules that predict
sex-allocation decisions. In this chapter, we make reference to Appendix E where we present
preliminary results for our second goal. Specifically, we present preliminary results for the
usefulness of a simple rule when territories of different quality can be on the same island.
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Chapter 2
Coevolution of sex allocation and dispersal
2.1 Introduction
Sexual species face a natural trade-off between investment in male reproductive function on
one hand and female reproductive function on the other. Individuals approach this trade-off
using sex-allocation strategies. Among dioecious species (i.e., species with separate sexes)
sex-allocation strategies determine the sex ratio, either entirely or in part.
Sex allocation has captured the attention of evolutionary biologists because of its obvious
implications for Darwinian fitness and because associated theory makes very clear predictions
(West, 2009). The strongest support for sex-allocation theory has come from organisms that
have simple life histories, often invertebrates (West et al., 2005). For invertebrates in particular,
simple rules are usually sufficient to predict bias in allocation decisions. For example, the
chalcidoid wasp Pachycrepoideus vindemiae has been found to bias its allocation towards the
more dispersive sex, a rule that is in keeping with theory that invokes competition among
kin (Hamilton, 1967; Nadel and Luck, 1992; Taylor, 1993). Another species, the parasitic
pteromalid wasp Lariophagus distinguendus, has been found to bias its sex allocation towards
the sex that receives a greater benefit from a higher-quality host (Charnov et al., 1981), a rule
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Symbol Definition
N number of territories on an island
pi frequency of islands with quality-i territories
αi allocation strategy where (i = g, b)
ds,i dispersal strategy where (s = m, f ) and (i = g, b)
K number of sons or daughters produced
cs cost of dispersal (s = m, f )
as,i competitive ability (s = m, f ) and (i = g, b)
qs the sex-s competitive quotient and is equal to as,g/as,b
vs,i reproductive value where (s = m, f ) and (i = g, b)
Ns,i total competitive pressure on an island where (s = m, f ) and (i = g, b)
ks,i probability breeder originated from the quality-i focal island
Ri relatedness between parent and offspring where (i = g, b)
R¯i relatedness between quality i breeder and offspring on the same island
Table 2.1: Summary of mathematical notation used in Chapter 2
that follows the well known Trivers-Willard hypothesis (TWH) (Trivers and Willard, 1973).
Numerous other examples of invertebrates that support the usefulness of simple rules to predict
sex-allocation decisions can be found (Hoagland, 1978; Charnov, 1979b; Charnov et al., 1981;
Frank, 1985; Werren, 1987; Frank, 1995).
Contrary to support for sex-allocation theory among invertebrate species, the applicability
of simple rules among vertebrate species has been mixed (Clark, 1978; Clutton-Brock et al.,
1986; Hewison and Gaillard, 1999). The difficulty in applying simple sex-allocation rules to
vertebrates, especially those based on the TWH, can be attributed to the relative complexity of
vertebrate life histories. When available theory has tried to cope with the complexities associ-
ated with vertebrates, the predictions generated have become less clear. Wild and West (2007)
developed a model that illustrates this point. Their model reflected the complexities commonly
associated with vertebrate life histories, and challenged simple rules of sex allocation by both
allowing for competition among kin and incorporating key features of the TWH. Wild and West
(2007) showed that as life-history features (in particular as evolutionarily fixed dispersal rates)
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changed in their model, the simple rules that work so well for invertebrates could fail in drastic
and unexpected ways for vertebrates. This casts further doubt on the usefulness of simple rules
for the study of vertebrate sex allocation, but more theoretical work needs to be done before
we abandon these convenient heuristics.
In this work, we construct a complicated life-history model for the evolution of sex alloca-
tion in order to further explore the usefulness of simple rules in problematic vertebrate species.
Like Wild and West (2007), we challenge simple rules by incorporating competition among
kin and elements of the TWH. Unlike Wild and West (2007), we allow dispersal to evolve
alongside sex allocation. Why do we allow dispersal to evolve? Because it has previously
been shown that when life histories are complex and invoke theory pertaining to competition
among kin, the coevolution or joint evolution of multiple traits in a species restores simple sex-
allocation rules (SAR) (Wild and Taylor, 2004). We find that a SAR based on the TWH can
be useful in understanding model predictions. We also find that improvements in its usefulness
can be due to dispersal evolution. Despite improved success, the SAR can fail and we outline
how it fails in relation to distribution of quality and asymmetries in sex-specific life-history
characteristics. We develop recommendations for the application of this sex-allocation theory
to studies of vertebrates.
2.2 Model
The definition of symbols used in this work can be found in Table 2.1.
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2.2.1 Preliminaries
We modify previous work (Leturque and Rousset, 2003; Wild and West, 2007) to model the
coevolution of sex allocation and sex-specific natal dispersal. Like many previous authors, we
use a class-structured inclusive-fitness approach based on discrete-time population dynamics
(Taylor and Frank, 1996; Taylor, 1996).
We consider a population made up of diploid dioecious individuals with nonoverlapping
generations. The model population is found in a habitat made up of a very large number of
islands. Each island is subdivided into N breeding territories, which are either all of good or
bad quality. Additionally, we let pi, where i = g (good), b (bad), denote the fraction of islands
with quality-i territories (sometimes referred to as a quality-i island), where pi remains constant
over time.
For the model, territory quality is important because it defines the quality of a breeder.
Good-quality (resp. bad-quality) breeders produce good-quality (resp. bad-quality) offspring.
However, offspring quality is only temporary. An offspring that establishes itself as a breeder
takes on the quality of its newly found territory. For the sake of brevity, we use the terms
quality-i breeder, quality-i breeding pair (a breeding female and her mate), and quality-i off-
spring, where i = g, b, as we develop the model below.
2.2.2 Life cycle
The life cycle consists of a series of life-history events (or “stages”) that occur in the following
order:
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Birth
Each breeding pair produces K sons and K daughters, where K is very large.
Parental care
A quality-i breeding female has a fixed amount of some resource that they must entirely devote
to offspring. She allocates the fraction αi to sons and 1 − αi to daughters, leaving them with
Kαi quality-i sons and K(1 − αi) quality-i daughters. We constrain the allocation behaviour to
be biologically relevant (i.e., 0 < αi < 1). We assume that allocation decisions are controlled
by the genotype of the female member of the breeding pair (i.e., we assume maternal control).
We also assume that, after investment, all breeding pairs in the population die. At this point,
only offspring remain.
Dispersal
Quality-i offspring disperse independently, with probability ds,i, where s = m (male), f (female).
We constrain dispersal to be biologically relevant (i.e., 0 < ds,i < 1). We assume that dispersal
is determined by the gynotype of the offspring itself (i.e., under offspring control). We also
assume that dispersal is costly. The cost associated with dispersal for males and females is cm
and c f , respectively. This means that only fraction 1 − cs of sex-s dispersers survive to the
next stage in the life history. Offspring who do not disperse do not pay a cost and survive to
the next stage in the life history with probability equal to one. Offspring that disperse do so
independently and compete for territories on an island, which is chosen uniformly at random
from the collection of all islands in the population. Consequently, offspring cannot choose the
quality of island where they will compete for breeding opportunities. Nondispersing offspring
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compete for territories on their natal island.
Male-male competition
Following the dispersal stage, male offspring compete for mates. The competitive ability of a
good-quality male offspring is am,g and the competitive ability of a bad-quality male offspring
is am,b, and we often focus on the ratio qm = am,g/am,b ≥ 1, which we call the male competition
quotient (MCQ). The total amount of male competitive effort on a quality-i island is denoted
by Nm,i and is calculated in Appendix A. Competition itself is modelled as a weighted lottery
with qm as weights.
The weighted lottery works as follows. Each male offspring competing for a given terri-
tory has a number of “tickets” that is directly proportional to its competitive ability, am,i. The
tickets of all male offspring competing on an island are collected, and tickets are then selected
uniformly at random with replacement until N are chosen. Male offspring whose tickets have
been chosen, win a breeding opportunity, and those whose tickets have not been chosen die.
Female-female competition
Female offspring compete for breeding territories. The competitive ability of a good-quality
female offspring is a f ,g and the competitive ability of a bad-quality female offspring is a f ,b, and
we often focus on the ratio q f = a f ,g/a f ,b ≥ 1, which we call the female competition quotient
(FCQ). The total amount of female competitive effort on a quality-i island is denoted by N f ,n
and is calculated in Appendix A. Competition itself is modelled as a weighted lottery (see
above, but replace males with females) with q f as weights.
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We allow for qm and q f to be different, and so we allow for sex-specific differences in returns
on parental allocation. This is a key difference between ours and previous work (Leturque and
Rousset, 2003). We also do not restrict ourselves to the assumption that males always receive
a greater benefit for being a good-quality offspring. This means that we consider both qm > q f
and qm < q f , unlike Wild and West (2007).
2.2.3 Inclusive fitness overview
We describe the evolutionary consequences of the model life history using an inclusive-fitness
approach (Hamilton, 1964; Taylor and Frank, 1996; Taylor, 1996). Inclusive fitness can be
defined in terms of reproductive value, in other words, an individual’s contribution to the gene
pool in the very distant future (Fisher, 1930). Specifically, the inclusive fitness of a given
individual is its genetic stake in the reproductive value of its contemporaries; it can be written
as a weighted sum of reproductive values, where weights are coefficients of genetic relatedness
(see Michod and Hamilton, 1980).
In this work, we do not study inclusive fitness per se, rather we study changes in inclusive
fitness. Moreover, for our purposes it will be convenient to split changes in inclusive fitness into
two components: direct and indirect. The former represents gains achieved through production
of immediate descendants and personal survival. The latter represents gains achieved through
the production of non-descendant kin and their survival.
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2.2.4 Evolution of sex allocation
To apply the inclusive-fitness approach to the evolution of sex allocation we fix attention on
a quality-i breeding female. We assume that this mutant individual, and only this mutant in-
dividual, increases its allocation strategy, αi, by a very small amount (Taylor, 1989). If the
inclusive-fitness change is positive, the mutation is beneficial and becomes the new wildtype
behaviour. We assume that changes in inclusive fitness are independent of the frequency of in-
dividuals using the mutant behaviour in the population. Further, we assume that two mutations
are not occurring simultaneously, which allows us to treat this process as a first-order pertur-
bation analysis. In Appendix A, we use a modeling technique developed by Taylor and Frank
(1996) to show the resulting changes in the inclusive fitness of the focal individual, holding all
other sex allocation and dispersal traits in the population fixed, can be expressed as
∆Wαi ∝
∑
j
(1 − dm,i)am,i
Nm,i
Nvm, jRi − (1 − d f ,i)a f ,iN f ,i Nv f , jRi︸                                                        ︷︷                                                        ︸
sex-allocation term A
+
∑
j
p j
dm,i(1 − cm)am,i
Nm, j
Nvm, jRi − p jd f ,i(1 − c f )a f ,iN f , j Nv f , jRi︸                                                                     ︷︷                                                                     ︸
sex-allocation term B
−km,i (1 − dm,i)am,iNm,i Nvm,iR¯i︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
sex-allocation term C
+ k f ,i
(1 − d f ,i)a f ,i
N f ,i
Nv f ,iR¯i︸                      ︷︷                      ︸
sex-allocation term D

, (2.1)
where vs,i is the individual reproductive value of a sex-s quality-i breeder, ks,i is the probability
a sex-s quality-i offspring would have won a breeding opportunity (s = m) or territory (s = f ),
Ri is the relatedness between a quality-i breeder and its own offspring, and R¯i is the relatedness
between a quality-i breeder and an average offspring born on the same island. In Appendix C,
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we provide a complete biological interpretation of the above equation.
Recall that the inclusive-fitness change in equation (2.1) is derived by assuming a mu-
tant quality-i breeding female invests slightly more resources into sons, and in turn, invests
slightly fewer resources into daughters. As a result, more sons and fewer daughters of the
mutant quality-i breeding female are surviving the parental care stage of the life cycle, com-
pared to the wildtype quality-i breeding female. The inclusive-fitness change in equation (2.1)
can be broken down into four terms. The first term (sex-allocation term A) is the sum of
direct inclusive-fitness gains through non-dispersing sons on one hand, and direct inclusive-
fitness losses through non-dispersing daughters. The second term (sex-allocation term B) is
the difference of direct inclusive-fitness gains through dispersing sons on one hand, and direct
inclusive-fitness losses through dispersing daughters on the other. Sex-allocation terms A and
B show that the focal breeding female faces a trade off between the production of sons and the
production of daughters. The third term (sex-allocation term C) represents indirect inclusive-
fitness losses due to increased competition for mates that comes from non-dispersing sons. The
fourth term (sex-allocation term D) represents indirect inclusive-fitness gains due to decreased
competition for breeding territories that comes from fewer non-dispersing daughters.
Sex allocation terms A through D, together, describe the overall inclusive-fitness change of
a quality-i breeding female slightly increasing its allocation strategy. When ∆Wαi is positive
(resp. negative), it is beneficial for the breeding female to slightly increase (resp. decrease) its
current allocation strategy.
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2.2.5 Evolution of dispersal
To apply the inclusive-fitness approach to the evolution of dispersal we fix attention on a sex-
s quality-i offspring. We assume that this individual, and only this individual, increases its
probability of dispersal, ds,i, by a very small amount (Taylor, 1989). In Appendix A, we use a
modeling heuristic developed by Taylor and Frank (1996) to show the resulting changes in the
inclusive fitness of the focal individual, holding all other sex allocation and dispersal traits in
the population fixed, can be expressed as
∆Wds,i ∝ −
∑
j
1
Nm,i
NRivs, j︸             ︷︷             ︸
dispersal term A
+ (1 − cs)
∑
j
p j
1
Ns, j
NRivs, j︸                           ︷︷                           ︸
dispersal term B
+ ks,i
1
Ns,i
NR¯ivs,i︸          ︷︷          ︸
dispersal term C

. (2.2)
In Appendix C, we provide a complete biological interpretation of the above equation.
Recall that the inclusive-fitness change in equation (2.2) is derived by assuming a mu-
tant sex-s quality-i offspring disperse slightly more frequently. As a result, this offspring is
more likely to compete on a non-natal territory than a wildtype offspring. The inclusive-fitness
change for dispersal in equation (2.2) can be broken down into three terms. The first term
(dispersal term A) is a direct inclusive-fitness loss through non-dispersing sex-s offspring. The
second term (dispersal term B) is a direct inclusive-fitness gain through dispersing sex-s off-
spring. The third term (dispersal term C) is a indirect inclusive-fitness gain due to decreased
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competition for mates or decreased competition for breeding territories when s = m and s = f ,
respectively.
Dispersal terms A through C, together, describe the overall inclusive-fitness change of a
sex-s quality-i offspring island that slightly increases its dispersal strategy. When ∆Wds,i is
positive (resp. negative), it is beneficial for the offspring to slightly increase (resp. decrease)
its current dispersal strategy.
2.3 Method of analysis
2.3.1 Evolutionary stability and numerical procedure
We are interested in finding adaptive sex-allocation and dispersal traits, αˆi and dˆs,i for all s and
i. To find the adaptive traits, we use equations (2.1) and (2.2) derived above. Recall that these
equations tell us the direction of selection for sex-allocation and dispersal traits, respectively.
When ∆Wαi > 0 (resp. < 0), selection favours sex-allocation strategies that invest slightly more
(resp. fewer) resources in male offspring than the current strategy. Similarly, if ∆Wds,i > 0 (resp.
< 0), selection favours strategies that result in more (resp. less) frequent dispersal. Due to
the complexity of this model we determine αˆi and dˆs,i using a numerical procedure. In general,
we begin our procedure by proposing a set of strategies, αi and ds,i. Based on the proposal
we determine the signs of inclusive-fitness changes described by (2.1) and (2.2). Then we
update our proposal according to sign of the associate inclusive-fitness expression. If ∆Wαi > 0
(resp. < 0) we increase (resp. decrease) αi by a small amount that is proportional to the
magnitude of ∆Wαi . If ∆W
d
s,i > 0 (resp. < 0) we increase (resp. decrease) ds,i by a small amount
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that is proportional to the magnitude of ∆Wds,i. We continue to update until the change in the
proposal is sufficiently small. We check multiple initial proposals to see if there are multiple
adaptive strategies (there were none). The code that implements this algorithm can be found in
Appendix D.
2.3.2 The simple allocation rule (SAR)
We test the predictive strength of a version of the TWH, which we henceforth refer to as the
SAR. The SAR will be said to “work” or is a “strong/good predictor of allocation decisions”
when good-quality breeders invest more resources in sons and bad-quality breeders invest more
in daughters when sons receive a greater benefit for being a good-quality offspring (qm > q f ).
The SAR also works when good-quality breeders invest more resources in daughters and bad-
quality breeders invest more in sons when daughters receive a greater benefit for being a good-
quality offspring (qm > q f ). Mathematically, the SAR works when
qm > q f implies αˆg >
1
2
> αˆb
or
qm < q f implies αˆg <
1
2
< αˆb

.
Conversely, the SAR will be said to “fail” or is a “poor/bad predictor of allocation decisions”
when the above conditions do not hold. A visual representation of the SAR can be found in
Figure 2.15.
We focus on a SAR based on the TWH rather than a SAR based on LRC because parent
and offspring quality is more readily observed in the field. Simple rules based on LRC would
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Figure 2.1: Visual representation of the simple allocation rule. When good-quality sons are the
better intrasexual competitor (occurs when qm > q f ), good-quality breeders should invest more
in sons (αg > 12 ) and bad-quality breeders should invest more in daughters (αb <
1
2 ). When
good-quality daughters are the better intrasexual competitor (occurs when qm < q f ), good-
quality breeders should invest more in daughters (αg < 12 ) and bad-quality breeders should
invest more in sons (αb > 12 ).
require information about migration patterns and genetic relatedness, and these are unlikely to
be as easy to uncover as measures of quality (e.g., size or weight). Essentially, we focus on the
TWH because the associated variables are likely to be easier to measure.
2.3.3 Previous results as special cases
To validate our numerical procedure we test it with several well-known special cases. First, we
compare to the work in Taylor (1988). Here, we consider a homogeneous population (pg = 1
and pb = 0), we allow for no sex-specific competitive differences (qm = q f = 1), and no sex-
specific costs of dispersal (cm = c f ). Following Taylor (1988), sex allocation is constrained to
be unbiased (αg = 0.5) and dispersal rate is constrained to be the same for male and female
offspring. We find that our numerical procedure recovers the results of Taylor (1988) for island
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sizes N = 1, ..., 20 (Figure 2.2).
A second comparison is to the work in Charnov (1979a) and Bull (1981). Here, we consider
a population that consists of islands with only one good or bad territory (N = 1). We constrain
the model so that dispersal is complete (ds,i = 1) and cost-free for both male and female
offspring (cm = c f = 0). As before, we find that our numerical procedure recovers the results
of Charnov (1979a) and Bull (1981) (Figure 2.3).
A third comparison is to the work in Wild and West (2007), described in the introduction.
As in the second comparison, the population consists of islands with only one good or bad
quality territory (N = 1). Male-offspring dispersal among these islands is constrained to be
complete (dm,i = 1). By contrast, female dispersal is constrained, and though it may be in-
complete, is independent of island/territory quality (d f ,i = d f for all i and n). All dispersal is
cost-free (cm = c f = 0). Our numerical procedure recovers tabulated results in Wild and West
(2007).
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Figure 2.2: We find agreement between the predictions in Taylor (1988) (solid coloured lines)
and those generated by our model (black dots). To make this comparison we set pg = 1, pb = 0,
qm = q f = 1, c = cm = c f , αg = 0.5, and d = ds,i for all s and i.
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Comparing sex-allocation evolution to Charnov (1979a) and Bull (1981)
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Figure 2.3: We find the agreement between the predictions in Charnov (1979a) and Bull (1981)
(solid lines) and those generated by our model (red and blue dots). The red dots represent
the sex-allocation strategy of good-quality breeders and blue dots represent the sex-allocation
strategy of bad-quality breeders. We denote the frequency of good-quality breeders and the
frequency of bad-quality breeders as pg and pb, respectively. For this figure we set N = 1,
ds,i = 1 for all s and i, cm = c f = 0, qm = 4, and q f = 2.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Setting the stage
This section is used to explain how we will present results in this work. Rather than presenting
the stable strategies themselves, we use graphical tools to evaluate the performance of the SAR.
As the cartoon in Figure 2.4 shows, we divide qm, q f -space into regions where the SAR works
and where it fails. We then propose a rationale for the observed changes in these regions, given
concomitant changes in parameters, and in the absence of analytical solutions of the model.
2.4.2 Dispersal evolution improves the performance of the SAR
In this subsection, we compare the predictive strength of our SAR when dispersal is allowed
to evolve versus when dispersal is not allowed to evolve. When dispersal is allowed to evolve
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Simple rule fails
Simple rule works
Figure 2.4: This cartoon shows how results will be presented in this work. Blue regions repre-
sent areas of parameter space where the SAR works and red regions represent areas of param-
eter space where the SAR fails. The central dashed gray line separates two distinct regions of
parameter space. Below the gray dashed line the MCQ is greater than the FCQ (qm > q f ) and
above the gray dashed line the MCQ is less than the FCQ (qm < q f ).
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we use equations (2.1) and (2.2), whereas when dispersal is not allowed to evolve we only use
equation (2.1) with fixed values of dispersal. For this comparison we set the costs associated
with dispersal to be the same for males and females (cm = c f ). Under these conditions, when
dispersal is allowed to evolve we find that the SAR always works (Figure 2.5c). We also find
that the dispersal rate for a sex-s quality-i offspring is unique in most cases (Figure 2.6). When
dispersal is not allowed to evolve, we find that the SAR can fail (Figure 2.5a and b). Granted,
results presented in Figure 2.5 assume that dispersal is sex-specific, but not conditioned on
offspring quality (dm = dm,g = dm,b and d f = d f ,g = d f ,b following Wild and West (2007)). This
assumption could exacerbate the failure of the SAR when dispersal is not allowed to evolve.
However, because the SAR always works when dispersal is allowed to evolve, any failure in
the SAR when dispersal is not allowed to evolve represents poorer performance.
Why does constraining dispersal evolution reduce the performance of the SAR? Simply
put, when dispersal is not allowed to evolve there are fewer “evolutionary degrees of freedom”.
In this case, sex allocation alone has to balance competing inclusive-fitness interests, which
results in compromises that would not be seen when sex allocation and dispersal coevolve.
Based on this result, we suggest that the concerns raised by Wild and West (2007) regarding
the application of verbal sex-allocation theory (simple rules) may be overstated.
2.4.3 Reducing sex-specific differences in dispersal cost improves the per-
formance of the SAR
As mentioned in the preceding subsection, the SAR always works when dispersal is allowed to
evolve, and the costs of dispersal are symmetric. However, if we allow for an asymmetry in the
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Symmetric sex-specific costs of dispersal (cm = cf)
fe
m
al
e 
co
m
pe
tit
ive
 q
uo
tie
nt
, q
f
male competitive quotient, qm
(a) dispersal is fixed (dm > df)
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(b) dispersal is fixed (dm < df)
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(c) dispersal evolves
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Figure 2.5: Allowing dispersal to evolve makes the predictive strength of the SAR better when
the sex-specific costs of dispersal are equal (cm = c f ). For all panels we set the pg = 0.6,
N = 10, and cm = c f = 0.2. (a) In this panel, dispersal is fixed and we assume that male
offspring disperse at a higher rate compared to female offspring (dm = dm,g = dm,b = 1.0 and
d f = d f ,g = d f ,b = 0.5). The SAR fails for a large region of parameter space. (b) In this
panel, dispersal is fixed and we assume that male offspring disperse at a lower rate compared
to female offspring (dm = dm,g = dm,b = 0.5 and d f = d f ,g = d f ,b = 1.0). Again, the SAR fails
for a large region of parameter space. (c) In this panel, dispersal is allowed to evolve and the
SAR always works.
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(a) the success of the simple rule
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(b) sex-specific dispersal rates
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Figure 2.6: When the costs of dispersal are the same for males and females (cm = c f ) and
sex allocation and sex-specific dispersal coevolve, dispersal rates for each sex and quality of
offspring are unique in most cases. In this plot, we set pg = 0.7, cm = c f = 0.2, and N = 10.
(a) The SAR always works. We look at the dispersal rates when q f = 5, which is marked by
the solid black horizontal line. (b) This panel shows the dispersal rates for each sex and quality
of offspring. The dispersal rate of good-quality males (dm,g) is in purple, the dispersal rate of
good-quality females (d f ,g) is in green, the dispersal rate of bad-quality males (dm,b) is in blue,
and the dispersal rate of bad-quality females (d f ,b) is in yellow. The vertical gray dashed line
represents when qm = q f = 5.
sex-specific costs of dispersal (i.e., cm , c f ), the SAR can fail, even when sex-specific dispersal
and sex allocation coevolve. We find that as the asymmetry in sex-specific costs of dispersal
is increased, there is a decline in the performance of the SAR (Figure 2.7). Conversely, if
we reduce the asymmetry in the sex-specific costs of dispersal, the performance of the SAR
improves. This result is due to the fact that sex allocation reflects sex-specific asymmetries
in the life history. By reducing other asymmetries, such as those stemming from the costs of
dispersal, we bring asymmetries due to competitive advantage into sharper focus; this drives
the SAR.
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(b) cm = 0.3 and cf = 0.1
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(c) overlaying panels (a) and (b)
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Figure 2.7: Reducing the asymmetry in the sex-specific costs of dispersal improves the perfor-
mance of the SAR. In this figure, sex-specific dispersal is able to evolve and we set pg = 0.7,
N = 10, and cm = 0.3. (a) This panel shows where the SAR fails when there is an asymmetry
in the sex-specific costs of dispersal. We set c f = 0.0. (b) This panel shows where the SAR
fails when we decrease the asymmetry in the sex-specific costs of dispersal compared to those
in panel a). (c) This panel overlays the outline of the failure region from panels a) and b). The
purple curves correspond to the initial asymmetry and the green curves correspond to when the
asymmetry is reduced.
2.4.4 The predictive ability of the SAR can become invariant to competi-
tive quotients
In this subsection, we show that the predictive strength of the SAR is affected by constraints on
behaviour. We constrain dispersal and sex allocation so that the values are biologically relevant
(i.e., 0 < dˆs,i < 1 and 0 < αˆi < 1). By bounding behaviour to biologically relevant ranges,
the success or failure of the SAR can depend entirely on qs′ when cs > cs′ , qs > qs′ , and qs is
sufficiently large. In other words, the point of failure of the SAR will occur at the same value
of qs′ for large ranges of qs (Figure 2.8). When cs > cs′ and qs is sufficiently large, bad-quality
breeders are investing all of their resources in sex-s′ offspring and sex-s′ bad-quality offspring
are always dispersing. These allocation and dispersal strategies cause good-quality breeders
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Figure 2.8: The success or failure of the SAR becomes invariant to the competitive quotient of
the sex with a higher dispersal cost. This plot depicts the case where the performance of the
SAR becomes invariant to the MCQ (qm) since we set cm > c f . Below the center dashed line
the SAR always fails at the same value of q f when qm is sufficiently large. To create this figure
we set pg = 0.7, cm = 0.3, c f = 0.0, and N = 10.
and good-quality offspring to use strategies that are invariant to changes in qs. Essentially,
when sufficiently large, the competitive quotient of the sex with a higher cost of dispersal does
not affect the success or failure of the SAR.
2.4.5 Increasing the differences in sex-specific competitive quotients does
not reduce the performance of the SAR
As expected, when sex-s offspring have a higher competitive quotient than sex-s′ offspring
(qs > qs′), increasing qs never makes the SAR a worse predictor of adaptive sex-allocation
decisions. A large asymmetry in the sex-specific competitive quotients overshadows other
30 Chapter 2. Coevolution of sex allocation and dispersal
asymmetries in the life history of the sexes. This allows us to effectively ignore other compo-
nents of the life history when constructing verbal arguments that predict allocation decisions.
Refer to bottom right and top left corners of Figure 2.7. As mentioned in the above section, the
performance of the SAR can become invariant to the competitive quotient of the sex with the
higher cost of dispersal. When invariant, further increasing qs will have no affect on the per-
formance of the SAR (bottom right corner of Figure 2.8). Thus, with all else being equal and
when qs > qs′ , increasing qs may cause the SAR to work where it otherwise would have failed,
but increasing qs will never cause the SAR to fail where it otherwise would have worked.
2.4.6 Increasing island size has a variable effect on the performance of
the SAR
The effect of changing the island size has a potential relationship with sex-specific costs of
dispersal. As we reduce the island size, N, with asymmetric costs of dispersal, the performance
of the SAR increases (Figure 2.9). We propose that this stems from the fact that dispersal has
the benefit of reducing competition among relatives. To be clear, as island size is reduced, a
series of events occurs: the relatedness among kin increases, which increases indirect inclusive-
fitness benefits of dispersal and essentially removes existing asymmetries in the sex-specific
costs of dispersal. This rationale is somewhat speculative because dispersal could evolve to
higher levels with decreasing island size, thus modifying the realized sex-specific costs of
dispersal. Additional investigations however, indicate that any reduction in dispersal rates are
not universal (Figure 2.10).
The above result only holds when the SAR has not become invariant to the competitive
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(b) N = 20
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(c) overlaying panels (a) and (b)
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Figure 2.9: Increasing the island size decreases the performance of the SAR. In this figure,
sex-specific dispersal is able to evolve and we set pg = 0.7, N = 10, cm = 0.3, and c f = 0.1.
(a) This panel shows where the SAR fails when N = 10. (b) This panel shows where the SAR
fails when N = 20. (c) This panels overlays the outline of the failure region from panels a) and
b). The purple curves correspond to N = 10 and the green curves correspond to N = 20.
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(a) pg = 0.3
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(b) pg = 0.7
N = 10
N = 20
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
Figure 2.10: When we increase the size of an island dispersal does not always decrease. The
orange points denote areas of parameter space where at least one class of offspring increases
their dispersal rate when we increasing island size from N = 10 to N = 20. The region
outlined by the green curves is where the SAR fails when N = 10. The region outlined by the
purple curves is where the SAR fails when N = 20. Throughout this panel we set cm = 0.3
and c f = 0.1. (a) The frequency of good-quality islands is pg = 0.3. (b) The frequency of
good-quality islands is pg = 0.7.
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Figure 2.11: Smaller island sizes cause the performance of the SAR to become invariant to the
competitive quotient of the sex with higher dispersal costs more quickly. In this plot the SAR
becomes invariant to the MCQ, qm, since cm > c f . In this plot we set pg = 0.7,cm = 0.3, and
c f = 0.1. We also varied island size through the values N = 5, 10, 20. Recall that the region
between the curves of the same color is where the SAR fails. If the top curve is not present for
a given color or a curve of a given color disappears, the diagonal dashed line acts as the top
curve.
quotient of the sex with higher dispersal costs. Smaller island sizes cause the SAR to become
invariant to lower values qs when cs > cs′ (Figure 2.11). We argue that bad-quality breeders
and bad-quality offspring are reaching the bounds on the biologically relevant ranges of sex
allocation and dispersal more quickly because of complications arising from kin competition.
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Figure 2.12: Increasing the frequency of good-quality territories does not always have a consis-
tent effect on the predictive ability of the SAR when competitive quotients are at intermediate
values. In this plot we set cm = 0.3, c f = 0.1, and N = 10. We vary the frequency of good-
quality territories in for the values pg = 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, and the associated line colors
can be found in the legend.
2.4.7 Distribution of quality critically influences the performance of the
SAR
As we have mentioned, if costs of dispersal are symmetric the SAR always works. However,
if the costs of dispersal are asymmetric we find that the SAR can fail in a way that depends
on the distribution of breeder quality. When competitive quotients are at intermediate values,
increasing or decreasing the frequency of good-quality islands does not affect the predictive
ability of the SAR in a consistent fashion (Figure 2.12). The results presented below only hold
when competitive quotients are very small or very large. To explain our findings as we change
distribution of breeder quality we divide our presentation into two cases.
We first look at the case when cs > cs′ and qs > qs′ . From the SAR, we should always expect
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good-quality breeders to invest more in sex-s offspring and bad-quality breeders to invest more
in sex-s′ offspring. While the bad-quality breeders always invest according to the SAR, good-
quality breeders do not (Figure 2.13). In short, whether the SARs fails or not depends on what
good-quality breeders do.
Following comments in the previous section, we know that, when cs > cs′ and qs > qs′ ,
good-quality breeders may not invest according to the SAR because high relative costs of sex-
s dispersal act to diminish competitive gains made by sex-s offspring. As the distribution
of breeder quality shifts towards greater frequencies of good-quality breeders, competition
pools contain greater numbers of good-quality offspring. In turn, greater numbers of good-
quality sex-s offspring implies a reduction in their realized competitive advantage, pushing
good-quality breeders towards (or further towards) investment strategies contrary to the SAR.
Indeed, as pg is increased in the first case, the SAR becomes a worse predictor of allocation
decisions, which can be seen Figure 2.14.
Next, we look at the case when cs > cs′ and qs < qs′ . From the SAR we should always
expect good-quality breeders to invest more in sex-s′ offspring and bad-quality breeders to
invest more in sex-s offspring. While the good-quality breeders always invest according to the
SAR in this case, bad-quality breeders do not (Figure 2.13). Now, whether the SAR fails or not
depends on what bad-quality breeders do.
In this case, bad-quality breeders may not invest according to the SAR because high rel-
ative costs of sex-s dispersal act to diminish competitive gains made by sex-s offspring. As
the distribution of breeder quality shifts towards greater frequencies of good-quality breeders,
competition pools contain smaller numbers of bad-quality offspring. In turn, smaller numbers
of bad-quality sex-s′ offspring increases their realized competitive advantage, pushing bad-
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Figure 2.13: When the SAR fails only one quality of breeder allocates in a way that is not
predicted. In this plot we set pg = 0.7, cm = 0.3, and c f = 0.1. (a) This panel shows where
the SAR works and fails using a familiar plot. (b) Here we take a cross section of panel a)
at the horizontal solid black line (q f = 5.5). The purple curve in panel b) represents the sex-
allocation strategy of good-quality breeders and the dark blue line represents the sex-allocation
strategy of bad-quality breeders. The horizontal gray short-dash line marks off the strategy of
equal allocation. The vertical gray long-dash line marks off when qm = q f = 5.5. To the left of
this line qm < q f and to the right of this line qm > q f . We can see that to the left of the vertical
gray long-dash line, good-quality breeders always invest according to the SAR, and to the right
of the vertical gray long-dash line, bad-quality breeders always invest according to the SAR.
The success or failure of the SAR is always a result of only one quality of breeder allocating
incorrectly.
quality breeders towards investment strategies that agree with the SAR. As pg is increased in
the second case, the SAR becomes a better prediction of allocation decisions, which can be
seen in Figure 2.14.
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(b) pg = 0.7
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(c) overlaying panels (a) and (b)
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Figure 2.14: Increasing the frequency of good-quality breeders has a variable effect on the
performance of the SAR. In this figure, sex-specific dispersal is able to evolve and we set
pg = 0.7, N = 10, cm = 0.3, and c f = 0.1. The nested plot (top left in each panel) shows
the frequency of good- and bad-quality breeders in the population. (a) This panel shows where
the SAR fails when pg = 0.3. (b) This panel shows where the SAR fails when pg = 0.7. (c)
This panel overlays the outline of the failure region from panels a) and b). The purple curves
correspond to pg = 0.3 and the green curves correspond to pg = 0.7. When qm > q f (below
the dashed line), increasing pg reduces the performance of the SAR. When qm < q f (above the
dashed curve), increasing pg improves the performance of the SAR.
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2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Recapitulation
In this work, we build an inclusive-fitness based model for the coevolution of sex allocation
and sex-specific dispersal with extensive differences in the life history of the sexes. We use the
model to test the predictive strength of a SAR for predicting adaptive sex-allocation decisions.
The rule, itself, is a version of the TWH. Overall, we find that the success or failure of the SAR
boils down to sex-specific differences in the life history.
The success of the SAR improves as sex-specific differences in competitive ability come to
overshadow all others. How can we make sex-specific difference in competitive ability over-
shadow all others? We can do it in two basic ways. The first is by increasing the competitive
ability of one (and only one) sex. The second is by reducing the other sex-specific differences
in life history.
Improvement in the first category is seen as we increase the advantage of a good-quality
individual of one (and only one) sex relative to a same-sex competitor of lower quality (§2.4.5).
It is also seen when we increase the advantage of a good-quality individual of one (and only
one) sex relative to an average same-sex competitor (§2.4.7).
Improvement in the second category is seen as we decrease the differences in sex-specific
cost of dispersal directly or by changes to the mitigating factors, such as social group size
(§2.4.3). We argue that the effect of dispersal evolution also falls into the second category.
When dispersal is fixed, sex allocation has to reflect all sorts of sex-specific differences in life
history. When dispersal is allowed to evolve, not only are there fewer sex-specific differences
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in life history to sort out, but there are additional mechanisms by which these differences can
be balanced out (§2.4.2).
2.5.2 Novelty of results
From one perspective some of our results are expected in light of previous work. For example,
we know that allowing dispersal to evolve alongside sex allocation has, in other models, led to
a balancing out of sex-specific differences in the life history that would appear otherwise (Wild
and Taylor, 2004). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the coevolution of dispersal and sex
allocation is able to improve the performance of the SAR.
From another perspective, though, our results concerning the coevolution of dispersal and
sex allocation could be considered surprising, or at least unanticipated. These results show,
among other things, that dispersal rates differ between the sexes, and so stand in stark contrast
to the corresponding case presented in Wild and Taylor (2004). In this way, our work goes
beyond previous theory (Leturque and Rousset, 2003; Wild and Taylor, 2004; Wild et al., 2006)
and provides concrete confirmation that dispersal evolution can play a key role in restoring
the usefulness of the SAR when applied to organisms with complicated life histories. With
dispersal evolution, the TWH may actually be more useful than previously argued by Wild and
West (2007). In later sections, we suggest when the application of a SAR based on the TWH
would be most useful.
Another result that is not particularly expected is the one related to changing island size.
Failure of SARs based on the TWH has been attributed to competing selective pressures of
differences in offspring quality on one hand, and competition among relatives on the other
2.5. Discussion 39
(Wild and West, 2007). Naively, then, we would expect that reduction in relatedness associated
with increasing island size would necessarily dilute competition among relatives, and improve
the performance of our SAR. We did not find this. Instead, we find that reducing relatedness
associated with increasing island size reduces indirect inclusive-fitness benefits. We provide a
narrative based on asymmetries that offers a better means of understanding sex allocation than
those offered by constrained models (Wild and West, 2007).
2.5.3 Better tests of the SAR
Our SAR is based on the work of Trivers and Willard (1973). Their hypothesis simply rec-
ognizes that some parents will want to make a greater-than-average investment in sons, while
others will want to make a smaller-than-average investment in sons, based on heritable quality.
The average allocation strategy that Trivers and Willard, and our SAR use as a benchmark is
an unbiased one. While we can think of many good reasons to compare to allocation strategies
that are biased (Hamilton, 1967; Clark, 1978; Bulmer and Taylor, 1980), unbiased strategies
represent a null benchmark that is particularly convenient for field studies. Our SAR is actu-
ally more than convenient as it is predicted to provide proper guidance concerning adaptive
sex allocation in many cases. That said, it seems natural to ask, if the SAR is so robust, why
has empirical support for the TWH been so equivocal? We suggest the answer is that there are
better (and worse) tests of the TWH.
Based on the predictions made by our model, the best applications of our SAR is in the
study of populations where there are no differences in the sex-specific costs of dispersal. The
SAR becomes less useful when there are differences in the sex-specific cost of dispersal. While
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we recognize that dispersal costs are difficult to measure, the performance of our SAR only
relies on differences (Wolff, 1994). Differences in sex-specific dispersal costs may be easier
to measure and field biologists should focus on these differences, and the SAR may be able to
help guide these studies.
As mentioned earlier in this work, empirical studies find conflicting evidence on the suc-
cess of the TWH within the same species, as is the case in the reindeer. The failure of the TWH
in one study (Skogland, 1986), and its success in another (Kojola and Eloranta, 1989) could
be explained by differences in the overall food availability between the studies. In other work,
Wiebe and Bortolotti (1992) mention that breeder quality should consist of both territory qual-
ity and food availability. It follows that as food availability decreases, the average quality in the
population decreases, and vice versa. As we show above, changing the average quality in the
population can cause the SAR to fail when it otherwise would have worked. This means that
the success or failure of the SAR could depend on how “good” a population is or the amount
of food available when censused. Of course, this explanation relies on the assumption that
breeders can alter their allocation strategy based on external shifts in quality (i.e., behaviour is
not constrained).
2.5.4 A “weak” version of the Trivers-Willard hypothesis
Here, we bring attention to a “weak” version of the TWH (wTWH). To begin, we are using the
word “weak” in the context that the requirements to satisfy the following hypothesis are not
as strong as the classical TWH (Trivers and Willard, 1973). A population follows the wTWH
when at least one quality of breeder invests according to the TWH. This means that good-
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quality breeders will invest more in sons (resp daughters) or bad-quality breeders will invest
more in daughters (resp. sons) when sons (resp. daughters) receive a greater benefit for being
of good quality.
In our model, we find that failures of the SAR were attributed to good- and only good-
quality breeders, or bad- and only bad-quality breeders not allocating according to the TWH.
Simply put, we never find that breeders invest in direct opposition of the TWH (see Figure
2.13).
The wTWH is a slight modification of the TWH, but has nontrivial implications. To be
clear, if the TWH correctly predicts allocation decisions, the wTWH also will. However, if
the TWH fails, the wTWH may not. The wTWH can be used as a way to classify populations
that have sex-specific asymmetries that counteract the sex-specific benefits of quality. We do
not suggest that this is a replacement for the TWH. Rather, this hypothesis can be easily used
alongside the TWH, and serves as a method of separating species from those that are in direct
opposition of the TWH. We suggest that future empirical studies mention the success or failure
of the wTWH when testing the TWH.
2.5.5 Future directions
We recognize that our model may not properly reflect the natural history of some vertebrates.
As a result, SARs may fail in ways that we are not able to account for. Future work should
focus on building targeted models that more accurately reflect the life history of a given species.
Targeted models can help us better understand when SARs that predict adaptive sex allocation
work and why they may fail.
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Figure 2.15: Visual representation of which breeder quality causes the simple allocation rule
(SAR) to fail. For this figure, we assume that cm > c f . Note that results will be mirrored if
this inequality is flipped. The allocation strategies predicted by the SAR that were not always
recovered by the model are in red boxes. When good-quality sons were the better intrasexual
competitor (qm > q f ), good-quality breeders would sometimes invest more in sons and bad-
quality breeders would always invest more in daughters. When good-quality daughters were
the better intrasexual competitor (qm < q f ), good-quality breeders would always invest more
in daughters and bad-quality breeders would sometimes invest more in sons. The SAR could
not always predict allocation decisions for breeders that should have invested in the sex with
higher dispersal costs.
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A limitation of our model that warrants further investigation is one regarding dispersal
costs. We consider sex-dependent dispersal costs, but not quality-dependent dispersal costs.
We define dispersal costs in this way to not over-complicate the model and the presentation of
results. Since we now know how asymmetric sex-specific costs of dispersal affect the predictive
strength of SARs, our model can be extended to include dispersal costs defined more generally.
It seems reasonable that good-quality offspring would not have the same dispersal cost as bad-
quality offspring. In this work, we show that amplifying the sex-specific asymmetries derived
from quality make our SAR a better predictor of allocation decisions. Increasing asymmetries
in the quality-specific dispersal cost of a given sex may have the same effect. The extent of this
effect, however, is unclear.
Another limitation comes from the way in which territory quality is distributed within a
population. Our model, as well as those previously built (Wild et al., 2006; Wild and West,
2007), assume that good- and bad-quality individuals are unrelated (i.e., breeder quality on
islands is homogeneous) and the consequences of relaxing this assumption are unclear. It
is worthwhile to investigate how the predictive ability of the SAR changes when individuals
of different quality can be related (i.e., breeder quality on islands is heterogeneous). This
suggestion is motivated by the kakapo (Stringops habroptilus) (Sutherland, 2002; Clout et al.,
2002). The kakapo exhibits lek mating, which is characterized by females choosing a mate
from a group of displaying males, and then raise the offspring elsewhere. It seems likely that
in this mating system, individuals of different quality can be related. Further, the TWH can be
applied to the kakapo (Sutherland, 2002; Clout et al., 2002). Thus, with the use of mathematical
models, the predictive strength of the SAR when quality among social groups is heterogeneous
can be tested.
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Chapter 3
Conclusion
In this thesis, we tested whether the coevolution of dispersal and sex allocation was able to
restore the usefulness of simple rules when applied to organisms with complex life histories.
We tested a version of the TWH (Trivers and Willard, 1973), which we refer to as the “simple
allocation rule” (SAR). The SAR stated that good-quality breeders will invest more in sons and
bad-quality breeders will invest more in daughters when sons receive a greater benefit for being
a good-quality offspring. To test this SAR, we built an inclusive-fitness model that incorporated
elements of the TWH and competition among kin.
We found that the SAR would always correctly predict allocation decisions when the sex-
specific costs of dispersal were the same for both males and females. When there was an
asymmetry in the sex-specific costs of dispersal, the SAR could fail for potentially large regions
of parameter space. We found that sex-specific differences in the life history play a critical role
in the predictive ability of the SAR.
Overall, we found that good tests of the TWH are likely to occur in populations where the
sex that has larger sex-specific costs of dispersal does not receive a greater benefit for being a
good-quality offspring, and when dispersal and sex allocation coevolve. This thesis provides
clear predictions, which can be easily tested by future empirical research.
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We have started to investigate how the predictive ability of the SAR is altered when the
quality of territories on an island is heterogeneous. This means that both good- and bad-quality
territories can be on the same island. Recall that this is the second goal mentioned in Chapter
1, and is motivated by lek mating in the kakapo (Sutherland, 2002; Clout et al., 2002). To
model this scenario, we can alter the model presented in Chapter 2 to accommodate for a
more general island structure. Specifically, we allow for a nonzero within-group variation in
territory quality. The within-group variation in territory quality is nonzero when islands consist
of both good- and bad-quality territories. This alteration has been carried out and preliminary
results can be found in Appendix E. As in Chapter 2, we find that when sex-specific dispersal
and sex allocation coevolve the SAR always works. Further, we find that when we reduce the
asymmetry in the sex-specific costs of dispersal, the SAR is a better predictor of allocation
decisions. Not surprisingly, we also find that the amount of within-group variation in territory
quality can critically affect the usefulness of SARs. Interestingly, we find that increasing the
within-group variation in territory quality can reduce or even remove regions where the SAR
fails. However, more work needs to be done to fully understand how and why nonzero within-
group variation in territory quality affects the usefulness of SARs that predict adaptive sex
allocation.
Future theoretical work will determine if alleviating other evolutionary constraints further
improves the usefulness of SARs to predict allocation decisions. For example, allowing off-
spring to search for a given quality of breeding territory may be able to offset the costs asso-
ciated with dispersal. If directed dispersal is able to offset the costs associated with dispersal,
the area of parameter space where the SAR fails in our current model would likely be reduced.
To model the evolution of directed dispersal, a trade-off would be imposed between searching
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for a breeding territory of the chosen type, and potentially foregoing a breeding opportunity
altogether. The difficulty in building this model will be to properly count the average number
of individuals competing for a given breeding territory and properly calculating relatedness
coefficients. Since we would now be investigating the coevolution of directed dispersal, dis-
persal, and sex allocation, methods proposed by Taylor and Frank (1996) would be the better
approach. When calculating evolutionary equilibria, the method in Taylor and Frank (1996) al-
lows us to use inclusive fitness expressions that tell us the direction of selection. Consequently,
we can reach evolutionary equilibria more quickly when using numerical methods compared
to individual-based simulation methods. As more traits evolve together, individual-based sim-
ulations would be used more as a check of our model than as a primary modeling technique.
Empirical studies will be vital to determine when evolutionary constraints on behaviour are
present so that the proper theory can be applied.
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Appendix A
Inclusive fitness – neighbour-modulated
fitness
The derivation presented in this appendix is for a more general case than the model described
in Chapter 2. In this derivation we refer to an island with n good-quality territories as a type-n
island.
We define α¯i,n as the average sex-allocation strategy of quality-i individuals on a type-n
island and α∗i,n as the global average sex-allocation strategy of quality-i breeders on type-n
islands. We define d¯s,i,n as the average dispersal strategy of sex-s quality-i individuals on a
type-n island and d∗s,i,n as the global average dispersal strategy of sex-s quality-i offspring on
type-n islands. First, we calculate total amount of competitive effort of males on a type-n
island. Please refer to table 2.1 for variable definitions. Note that Bi,n is the number of quality-i
territories on a type-n island.
A.1 Total competitive pressure of males
The number of males competing on a focal island can be broken down into the amount of
competitive effort among migrant males and native males. On each non-focal island of type
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k, Bi,kKα∗i,k viable male offspring born on a quality i territory are produced and the fraction
d∗m,i,k(1 − cm) survive dispersal, where the asterisk denotes the global average conditional strat-
egy. There are Mpk islands of type k and each male has a competitive ability of am,i. The
probability that migrant males land on the focal island is 1/M, as each island gets their “fair
share” of immigrants, so the competitive pressure from migrant males is
migrant males = K
∑
i
am,i
∑
k
d∗m,i,k(1 − cm)pkBi,kα∗i,k .
The local competitive pressure from males is the fraction of surviving native sons that do not
disperse on the focal island of type n. As before, each of these males compete with ability am,i.
The competitive pressure from native males is
native males = K
∑
i
(1 − d¯m,i,n)Bi,nα¯i,nam,i ,
where the bar denotes island average conditional strategies. Consequently, the total competitive
pressure of males on an island with n good-quality territories is
Nm,n = migrant males + native males
= K
∑
i
am,i
(1 − d¯m,i,n)Bi,nα¯i,n + ∑
k
d∗m,i,k(1 − cm)pkBi,kα∗i,k

 .
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A.2 Total competitive pressure of females
Using a similar argument as above, the total competitive pressure of females on a focal island
with n good-quality territories is
N f ,n = K
∑
i
a f ,i
(1 − d¯ f ,i,n)Bi,n(1 − α¯i,n) + ∑
k
d∗f ,i,k(1 − c f )pkBi,k(1 − α∗i,k)
 .
A.3 Deriving the genetic contributions
We define us,i,n as the frequency of a sex-s quality-i breeder on a type-n island. Following
Taylor and Frank (1996), we define the matrix A to store genetic contributions of individuals
in the next generation. The entry Aξ←η is interpreted as the genetic contribution of breeders
in class η towards the next generation of breeders in class ξ. Note classes of breeders are
represented by their sex, their quality, and their island type, which is summarized by the ordered
triplet (s, i, n).
In this model, we census the population right before the birth of offspring. There are two
different routes a focal sex-s quality-i breeder on a type-n island can make genetic contributions
and are detailed below.
We define βs,i,n as the fraction of resources allocated towards a sex-s offspring by a quality-i
breeder on a type-n island (i.e., βm,i,n = αi,n and β f ,i,n = 1 − αi,n).
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A.3.1 Genetic contributions through non-dispersing offspring
In the case of genetic contributions through non-dispersing offspring, genetic contributions
can only be achieved on focal breeders island type. We define the genetic contribution of a
class-(s, i, n) focal breeder to class-(z, j, n) breeders in the next generation as ρ(z, j,n)←(s,i,n). Since
individuals are diploid all genetic contributions are weighted by a half. A class (s, i, n) breeder
produces K male offspring that survive with probability βz,i,n, do not disperse with probability
1 − dm,i,n, and compete with competitive ability az,i. The total competitive pressure of sex-
z offspring on a type-n island is Nz,n (derived above) and there are a total of B j,n quality- j
territories to compete for. The genetic contribution of a class-(s, i, n) focal breeder to class-
(z, j, n) breeders in the next generation is
ρ(z, j,n)←(s,i,n) =
1
2
(1 − dz,i,n)Kβz,i,naz,i
Nz,n
B j,n .
A.3.2 Genetic contributions through dispersing offspring
In the case of genetic contributions through dispersing offspring, genetic contributions can be
achieved on any island type. Class-(s, i, n) breeders produce K sex-z offspring that survive
with probability βz,i,n and disperse with probability dz,i,n. These offspring survive dispersal with
probability (1−cz,i) and find a type-k island with probability pk. Since these male offspring were
born on a quality-i territory, their competitive ability is az,i. The total amount of competitive
effort of males on a type-k island is Nz,k and there are B j,k quality- j territories available. As
before, all genetic contributions are weighted by a half because individuals in this population
are assumed to be diploid. The genetic contribution of a class-(s, i, n) focal breeder to class-
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(z, j, k) breeders in the next generation is
τ(z, j,k)←(s,i,n) =
1
2
dz,i,n(1 − cz,i)Kαi,npkaz,i
Nz,k
B j,k .
A.4 Class frequencies and reproductive value
As mentioned previously, we define us,i,n as the frequency of a sex-s quality-i breeders on a
type-n island or more simply as the frequency of a class-(s, i, n) breeder. We define vs,i,n as the
reproductive value of a class-(s, i, n) breeder.
A.4.1 Calculating class frequencies
The equilibrium class frequencies u f ,i,n = um,i,n = MpnBi,n/N ∝ pkBi,k. This is because there
are Mpn islands of type n and on each of these islands the fraction Bi,n/N of territories are
quality i.
A.4.2 Calculating reproductive value
As mentioned in Taylor (1996) and Wild and West (2007), class reproductive values, Cs,i,n,
are found by calculating the dominant left eigenvector of a matrix P. The entry Pξ,η is the
probability that a gene in a class-ξ breeder was in a class-η breeder in the previous generation.
For the brevity of the following argument we define βs,i,n as the amount of resources allo-
cation towards a sex-s offspring by a quality-i breeder on a type-n island (i.e., βm,i,n = αi,n and
β f ,i,n = 1 − αi,n).
We define k(s,i,n)←(z, j,n) as the probability a gene now in a class-(s, i, n) breeder on their natal
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island was in a class-(z, j, n) breeder in the previous generation. The class-(z, j, n) breeder
would have produced K sex-s offspring and there were B j,n quality- j breeders on a type-n
island. The sex-s offspring survived with probability βs, j,n and had the competitive ability
as, j. These offspring do not disperse with with probability 1 − ds, j,n and the total competitive
pressure of males on this island is Ns,n. Notice that the indexes z and i do not appear in the
above function, so we let ks, j,n = k(s,i,n)←(z, j,n). As before, all genetic contributions are weighted
by a half. The probability a gene now in a class-(s, i, n) breeder on their natal island was in a
class-(z, j, n) breeder in the previous generation is
ks, j,n = k(s,i,n)←(z, j,n)
=
(1 − ds, j,n)B j,nKβs, j,nas, j
Ns,n
 .
Using a similar argument as above, but accounting for the dispersal of offspring, the prob-
ability a gene now in a class-(s, i, n) breeder was in a class-(z, j, k) breeder in the previous
generation is
κs,n, j,k = κ(s,i,n)←(z, j,k)
=
ds, j,k(1 − cs, j)pkB j,kKβs, j,kas, j
Ns,n
 .
All terms in the matrix P are multiplied by a half because the population consists of diploid
individuals. Analytical expressions of the class reproductive values quickly become intractable
so a numerical approach is used. The numerical approach is as follows: i) make an initial
guess at the class reproductive values, ii) left multiply the matrix P by the row vector of class
reproductive values, iii) normal the row vector of class reproductive values, iv) repeat ii and
iii until an error tolerance has been met. To find the individual reproductive values, vs,i,n, we
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divide the class reproductive values, Cs,i,n, by the frequency of individuals in that class, us,i,n.
A.5 The inclusive-fitness effect
Taylor and Frank (1996) define the inclusive-fitness effect as
∂W
∂x
∣∣∣∣∣
x=x¯=x∗
= v
∂A
∂x
u,
where v is the row vector of individual reproductive values, u is the column vector of class
frequencies, and ∂A/∂x is the matrix of element wise derivatives with respect to the allele x the
determines expression of a trait. In our case we have sex allocation and dispersal evolving so
we will need to derive two inclusive-fitness expressions. We drive inclusive fitness expressions
for the evolution of dispersal, ds,i,n, and sex allocation, αi,n. We will begin with dispersal and
move on to sex allocation.
Again, for the brevity of the following argument we reiterate that, βs,i,n is defined as the
amount of resources allocation towards a sex-s offspring by a quality-i breeder on a type-n
island (i.e., βm,i,n = αi,n and β f ,i,n = 1 − αi,n).
We have to update the notation before we begin taking derivatives. We will superscript
the trait that is evolving (dispersal or sex allocation) with the class of breeder whose genetic
contribution is being altered. For example, if the trait dz,i,n is evolving it affects the success of
related offspring. We redefine the evolving trait, dz,i,n to include the information of the affected
offspring (i.e., dz,i,n becomes dz,i,nz,i,n). This allows us to use the proper relatedness coefficients in
our inclusive-fitness expressions when derivatives are taken.
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A.5.1 The inclusive-fitness effect of dispersal
The derivative ∂dz,i,nz,i,n/∂x is the relatedness between a quality-i breeder on a type-n island and
their sex-z offspring, which we denote as Ri,n. The derivative ∂d¯
z, j,n
z,i,n/∂x is the relatedness be-
tween a quality-i breeder on a type-n island and a randomly selected sex-z quality- j offspring
on the same island, which we denote as R¯i, j,n. We assume that the relatedness is zero between
individuals born on different islands.
After carefully taking derivatives and some simplifying we arrive at the inclusive fitness
expression for dispersal
∂Wds,i,n
∂x
∝
∑
j
− 1
Ns,n
B j,nRi,nvs, j,n +
∑
l
ks, j,n
1
Ns,n
Bl,nR¯i, j,nvs,l,n + (1 − cs,i)
∑
t,k
pk
1
Ns,k
Bt,kRi,nvs,t,k ,
where j, l, and t are all indexes for good and bad quality territories and k = 0, ...,N is the
number of good-quality territories on an island. The above equation was further verified by a
biological argument presented in Appendix C.
A.5.2 The inclusive-fitness effect of sex allocation
Similar to the argument above, the derivative ∂αz,i,ni,n /∂x is the relatedness between a quality-i
breeder on a type-n island and their own sex-z offspring, which we denote as Ri,n. The derivative
∂α¯
z, j,n
i,n /∂x is the relatedness between a quality-i breeder on a type-n island and a randomly
selected sex-z quality- j offspring on the same island, which we denote as R¯i, j,n.
Again, after carefully taking the derivatives we arrive at the inclusive fitness expression for
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sex allocation
∆Wαs,i,n ∝
∑
j
(1 − dm,i,n)am,i
Nm,n
B j,nvm, j,nRi,n − (1 − d f ,i,n)a f ,iN f ,n B j,nv f , j,nRi,n
+
∑
j,l
−km,l,n (1 − dm,i,n)am,iNm,n B j,nvm, j,nR¯i,l,n + k f ,l,n
(1 − d f ,i,n)a f ,i
N f ,n
B j,nv f , j,nR¯i,l,n
+
∑
t,k
pk
dm,i,n(1 − cm)am,i
Nm,k
Bt,kvm,t,kRi,n − pk d f ,i,n(1 − c f )a f ,iN f ,k Bt,kv f ,t,kRi,n

,
where j, l, and t are all indexes for good and bad quality territories and k = 0, ...,N is the
number of good-quality territories on an island. The above equation was further verified by a
biological argument presented in Appendix C.
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Appendix B
Relatedness
We present a more general argument for relatedness coefficients than needed in Chapter 2.
We derive relatedness coefficients in this way so that we can later investigate the consequences
of nonzero relatedness between individuals of different quality. Note that Rg in Chapter 2 is
defined as Rg,N here, Rb in Chapter 2 is defined as Rb,0 here, R¯g is defined as R¯g,g,N here, and
R¯b is defined as R¯b,b,0 here.
To calculate the relatedness between an offspring and a focal parent, and an offspring from
another territory and a focal parent we use an argument that calculates the probability of a gene
being in a certain class in the previous generation. This method closely follows those in Michod
and Hamilton (1980) and Wild and Taylor (2004). We define the inbreeding coefficient, Fi, as
the probability two genes are identical by descent from a quality-i breeder. The coefficient of
consanguinity (CC) between a quality-i breeding female and her mate is defined as Gi. As
in the main text, we define ks, j,n as the probability a sex-s quality- j offspring won a breeding
opportunity on their natal island of type-n; mathematically,
ks, j,n = k(s,i,n)←(z, j,n) =
(1 − ds, j,n)B j,nKβs, j,nas, j
Ns,n
.
61
62 Chapter B. Relatedness
Additionally, we use the term Hs,i;z, j as the CC between a sex-s quality-i breeder and sex-
z quality- j breeder. Both of these breeders must be on the same type-n island. Note that
Hs,i;z, j = Hz, j;s,i.
To calculate the CCs we utilize a verbal argument that calculates the probability two genes
are identical by descent. When calculating the CC between two breeders we choose one gene
at random, replace it, and then choose another. The system of recursive equations describing
the inbreeding coefficients and CCs are
F′g = Gg
F′b = Gb
G′g = km,g,nk f ,g,n
(
1
4
H f ,g; f ,g +
1
2
Hm,g; f ,g +
1
4
Hm,g;m,g
)
+ km,g,nk f ,b,n
(
1
4
H f ,g; f ,b +
1
4
Hm,g; f ,b +
1
4
H f ,g;m,b +
1
4
Hm,g;m,b
)
+ km,b,nk f ,g,n
(
1
4
H f ,b; f ,g +
1
4
Hm,b; f ,g +
1
4
H f ,b;m,g +
1
4
Hm,b;m,g
)
+ km,b,nk f ,b,n
(
1
4
H f ,b; f ,b +
1
2
Hm,b; f ,b +
1
4
Hm,b;m,b
)
G′b = km,g,nk f ,g,n
(
1
4
H f ,g; f ,g +
1
2
Hm,g; f ,g +
1
4
Hm,g;m,g
)
+ km,g,nk f ,b,n
(
1
4
H f ,g; f ,b +
1
4
Hm,g; f ,b +
1
4
H f ,g;m,b +
1
4
Hm,g;m,b
)
+ km,b,nk f ,g,n
(
1
4
H f ,b; f ,g +
1
4
Hm,b; f ,g +
1
4
H f ,b;m,g +
1
4
Hm,b;m,g
)
+ km,b,nk f ,b,n
(
1
4
H f ,b; f ,b +
1
2
Hm,b; f ,b +
1
4
Hm,b;m,b
)
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,
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and
H′f ,g; f ,g =
1
Bg,n
1 + Fg
2
+
Bg,n − 1
Bg,n
(
k f ,g,nk f ,g,n
[
1
4
H f ,g; f ,g +
1
2
Hm,g; f ,g +
1
4
Hm,g;m,g
]
+2k f ,g,nk f ,b,n
[
1
4
H f ,g; f ,b +
1
4
Hm,g; f ,b +
1
4
H f ,g;m,b +
1
4
Hm,g;m,b
]
+k f ,b,nk f ,b,n
[
1
4
H f ,b; f ,b +
1
2
Hm,b; f ,b +
1
4
Hm,b;m,b
])
H′f ,g; f ,b = H¯( f , f )
H′f ,b; f ,b =
1
Bb,n
1 + Fb
2
+
Bg,n − 1
Bg,n
H¯( f , b, f , b)
H′m,g;m,g =
1
Bg,n
1 + Fg
2
+
Bg,n − 1
Bg,n
H¯(m, g,m, g)
H′m,g;m,b = H¯(m,m)
H′m,b;m,b =
1
Bb,n
1 + Fb
2
+
Bg,n − 1
Bg,n
H¯(m, b,m, b)
H′m,g; f ,g = H¯(m, f )
H′m,g; f ,b = H¯(m, f )
H′m,b; f ,g = H¯(m, f )
H′m,b; f ,b = H¯(m, f )

,
where
H¯(s, z) = ks,g,nkz,g,n
[
1
4
H f ,g; f ,g +
1
2
Hm,g; f ,g +
1
4
Hm,g;m,g
]
+ ks,g,nkz,b,n
[
1
4
H f ,g; f ,b +
1
4
Hm,g; f ,b +
1
4
H f ,g;m,b +
1
4
Hm,g;m,b
]
+ ks,b,nkz,g,n
[
1
4
H f ,b; f ,g +
1
4
Hm,b; f ,g +
1
4
H f ,b;m,g +
1
4
Hm,b;m,g
]
+ ks,b,nkz,b,n
[
1
4
H f ,b; f ,b +
1
2
Hm,b; f ,b +
1
4
Hm,b;m,b
]

,
where s and z are used to represent the the sexes male (m) and female ( f ).
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The equilibrium values from the above set of recursive equations is long and not easily
simplified so they have been omitted from this appendix. The relatedness between a quality-i
breeder on a type-n island and their offspring is
Ri,n =
1 + 3F
4
(
1 + F
2
)−1
,
where (1 + F)/2 is the CC between a breeder and itself, and (1 + 3F)/4 is the coefficient
of consanguinity between a breeder and its offspring. We found that F = Fg = Fb. This
means that the probability that two genes are identical by descent in a breeder is independent
of quality. Additionally, we found that the coefficient of relatedness between a breeder and its
offspring is independent of the offspring’s sex, which makes sense for diploid organisms.
The relatedness between a quality-i breeder and a quality- j offspring on a type-n island is
R¯i, j,n =
[
1
4
H f ,i; f , j +
1
4
Hm,i; f , j +
1
4
H f ,i;m, j +
1
4
Hm,i;m, j
] (
1 + F
2
)−1
,
where, again, (1 + F)/2 is the CC between a breeder and itself, and H¯( f , s) is the CC between
B.1. References 65
B.1 References
Michod, R. E. and Hamilton, W. D. (1980). Coefficients of relatedness in sociobiology. Nature,
288(5792):694–697.
Wild, G. and Taylor, P. D. (2004). Kin selection models for the co-evolution of the sex ratio
and sex-specific dispersal. Evolutionary Ecology Research, 6(4):481–502.
Appendix C
Inclusive fitness – biological arguments
C.1 Inclusive fitness biological argument – Dispersal
A focal individual on a quality i patch in a type n island who slightly increases its disper-
sal strategy loses out on potential fitness gains from the male offspring that would have won
patches on the natal territory. Each of these males could have won a type j = g, b patch with
probability am,iαi,n/Nm,n. There are B j,n territories of type j on the natal island to potentially
win and the offspring would have a reproductive value of vm, j,n on this territory. Of course,
this needs to be weighted by the coefficient of relatedness between a quality i parent and an
offspring on an island with n good-quality territories, which we call Ri,n. The resulting fitness
loss is
−
∑
j
am,iαi,n
Nm,n
B j,nRi,nvm, j,n .
Even though the focal individual is losing fitness in the way described above, they are able
to recuperate some fitness from related islandmates who would now be able to win these ter-
ritories. This fitness gain can be seen as the probability an offspring from the focal individual
would have won the territory, but instead an offspring from another natal patch wins it. Again,
the focal offspring would have won a territory with probability am,iαi,n/Nm,n and had reproduc-
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tive value vm, j,n on this territory. The probability a random natal individual wins the island is
km,l,n = (1 − dm,l,n)Bl,nKαl,nam,l/Nm,n, where l = g, b is the quality of the individuals natal patch.
We now must weight this new expression by the relatedness between a parent from a patch of
type i with an offspring from a randomly selected patch of type l on the focal island, which we
call R¯i,l,n (derived in Appendix B). The resulting fitness gain is
∑
j,l
kl,n
am,iαi,n
Nm,n
B j,nR¯i,l,nvm, j,n .
Finally, the focal individual gets some fitness benefit by dispersing its offspring. Offspring
survive the dispersal event with probability 1 − cm,i and arrive on an island with k good-quality
territories with probability pk. On this island the offspring competes for Bt,k territories of type
t = g, b and successfully competes for a given territory with probability am,iαi,n/Nm,k. They have
a reproductive value vm,t,k on this territory. Again, we must weight this term by the relatedness
between a parent and an offspring of quality i on an island with n good-quality territories, Ri,n.
The resulting fitness gain is
(1 − cs,i)
∑
t,k
pk
am,iαi,n
Nm,k
Bt,kRi,nvm,t,k .
Before we combine the previously derived terms of the inclusive fitness expression we note
that the evolutionary argument to derive the expression describing the fitness consequences
of altering the dispersal of females is quite similar as the argument above. So we generalize
the above terms and introduce s to distinguish between males (s = m) and females (s = f ).
With some simplification and removed of spurious terms, the inclusive fitness expression for
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the dispersal of sex s offspring on a focal territory of type i on an island with n good-quality
territories is
∆Wds,i,n ∝
∑
j
1
Ns,n
B j,nvs, j,n
Ri,n + ∑
l
kl,nR¯i,l,n
 + (1 − cs,i) ∑
t,k
pk
1
Ns,k
Bt,kRi,nvs,t,k ,
where
ks,l,n =

(1 − dm,l,n)Bl,nKαl,nam,l
Nm,n
if s = m
(1 − d f ,l,n)Bl,nK(1 − αl,n)a f ,l
N f ,n
if s = f
 .
C.2 Inclusive fitness biological argument – Sex Allocation
By investing more resources into male offspring the focal individual receives a fitness gain from
the increased number of surviving male offspring, but suffers a fitness loss from the reduced
number of surviving female offspring. The additional male offspring remain on the natal island
and win a territory with probability (1−dm,i,n)am,i/Nm,n and compete for B j,n territories of quality
j. Males who win a territory have reproductive value vm, j,n. This fitness gain is weighted by the
relatedness between a parent and an offspring produced on a quality i patch on an island with
n good-quality territories, Ri,n. Similarly, a fitness loss is incurred due to “giving up” potential
surviving female offspring. These offspring would have remained on the natal island and won
a territory with probability (1 − dm,i,n)am,i/Nm,n and compete for B j,n territories of quality j.
Females who win a territory have a reproductive value of v f , j,n. We weight this term by the
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relatedness between a parent and an offspring, Ri,n. This term is
∆Wα
′
i,n =
∑
j
(1 − dm,i,n)am,i
Nm,n
B j,nvm, j,nRi,n − (1 − d f ,i,n)a f ,iN f ,n B j,nv f , j,nRi,n .
Next, we calculate the fitness consequences of related individuals either being forced out
of or allowed to settle on territories as a result of the focal individual changing its allocation
strategy. For this term, allocating more resources to males causes a fitness loss as related is-
landmates are potentially losing territories they otherwise would have won and females cause
a fitness gain for the opposite reason. Again, offspring of the focal individual remain on their
natal island and win a territory with probability (1 − dm,i,n)am,i/Nm,n and compete for B j,n terri-
tories of quality j. On this territory the offspring would have reproductive value vm, j,n. Another
individual natal to the island from a quality l territory would have won a territory with proba-
bility km,l,n. This term is weighted by the relatedness between the quality i focal individual and
an offspring created on a quality l territory on an island with n good-quality territories, R¯i,l,n.
The argument for the fitness benefit of allocating less resources into females is very similar to
the presented argument and will be omitted for brevity. The resulting term is
∆Wα
′′
i,n =
∑
j,l
−km, j,n (1 − dm,i,n)am,iNm,n B j,nvm, j,nR¯i,l,n + k f ,l,n
(1 − d f ,i,n)a f ,i
N f ,n
B j,nv f , j,nR¯i,l,n .
Finally, we calculate the fitness consequences of dispersing offspring when a focal indi-
vidual changes its allocation strategy. As with the first term, allocating more resources into
males results in a fitness benefit whereas allocating less into females results in a fitness loss.
Male offspring survive dispersal with probability 1 − cm,i and arrive at an island with k good-
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quality territories with probability pk. They win one of Bt,k quality t patches with probability
dm,i,nam,i/Nm,k and have reproductive value vm,t,k on this territory. As always, this is weighted by
the relatedness between the focal parent and its offspring, Ri,n. The argument for the fitness loss
of allocating less into females is similar to the presented argument and will be again omitted
for brevity. The resulting term is
∆Wα
′′′
i,n =
∑
t,k
pk
dm,i,n(1 − cm,i)am,i
Nm,k
Bt,kvm,t,kRi,n − pk d f ,i,n(1 − c f ,i)a f ,iN f ,k Bt,kv f ,t,kRi,n .
By combining the previous three terms we find the inclusive fitness expression for resource
allocation on a quality i territory contained within an island with n good-quality territories.
This expression is
∆Wαi,n ∝ ∆Wα
′
i,n + ∆W
α′′
i,n + ∆W
α′′′
i,n .
Appendix D
Code
D.1 main mpi band.cpp
1 #include "stdio.h"
#include "stdlib.h"
#include "dunn.h"
#include "mpi.h"
5
#include "function_N.h"
#include "function_kappa.h"
#include "function_k.h"
#include "function_relatedness.h"
10 #include "function_v_organize.h"
#include "function_v.h"
#include "function_Wx_d.h"
#include "function_Wx_alpha.h"
#include "function_organize.h"
15
double maximum(double a, double b){
if(a > b){
return a;
}
20 else {
return b;
}
}
25 int main (int argc, char ** argv){
MPI_Init(&argc, &argv);
////// edited parameters
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
double K = 100.0; // number of offspring produced
double h = 0.01; // numerical step size
30 double Nval = 10; // number of patches on a territory
int N_int = static_cast <int>(Nval);
double M = 100; // number of islands
int num_island_types = 2;
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35 double island_info[2][2] = {{10,(double) 0.6},{0,(double) 0.4}};
//int num_island_types = 1;
//double island_info[1][2] = {{3,1.0}};
40 double a[2][2] = {{1,1} // male competitive advantage
,{1,1}}; // female, keep 2nd
column at 1
double c[2][2] = {{0.1,0.1} // male cost of dispersal
,{0.3,0.3}}; // female
45
int cognition = 1; // 0 strategies are island and territory
specific
// 1 strategies are territory
specific
int repeatrun = 1;
//
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
50
clock_t begin;
begin = clock();
srand (time(NULL));
55
int row_index;
double max_diff;
// initalize and populate B -- number of good and bad quality
territories
60 double ** B;
calloc_2D_double(&B,2,num_island_types);
for (int i = 0; i < num_island_types; ++i){
B[0][i] = island_info[i][0];
B[1][i] = Nval-island_info[i][0];
65 }
// initialize and populate p -- frequency of islands
double * p;
p = (double *) calloc(num_island_types ,sizeof(double));
70 for (int i = 0; i < num_island_types; ++i){
p[i] = island_info[i][1];
}
// initialize alpha, d, and v
75 double ** alpha, *** d, *** v;
calloc_2D_double(&alpha,2,num_island_types);
calloc_3D_double(&d,2,2,num_island_types);
calloc_3D_double(&v,2,2,num_island_types);
80 // builds arrays to know if islands only have one type of territory
on them
int * territory_types_start , * territory_types_end;
D.1. main mpi band.cpp 73
territory_types_start = (int *) calloc(num_island_types ,sizeof(int)
);
territory_types_end = (int *) calloc(num_island_types ,sizeof(int)
);
for (int i = 0; i < num_island_types; ++i){
85 if (B[0][i] == 0){
territory_types_start[i] = 1;
territory_types_end[i] = 2;
}
else if (B[0][i] == N_int){
90 territory_types_start[i] = 0;
territory_types_end[i] = 1;
}
else {
territory_types_start[i] = 0;
95 territory_types_end[i] = 2;
}
}
// this is the number of behaviours evolving
100 // each territory quality on each island has 3 behaviours eolving (
male dispersal , female dispersal , and sex allocation)
int W_size = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < num_island_types; i++){
if (B[0][i] == 0 || B[0][i] == N_int){
W_size += 3;
105 }
else {
W_size += 6;
}
110 }
double * W;
W = (double *) calloc(W_size,sizeof(double));
115 double * x1, * x2, * xtemp;
x1 = (double *) calloc(W_size,sizeof(double));
x2 = (double *) calloc(W_size,sizeof(double));
int whilestop , iter;
120
int world_rank;
MPI_Comm_rank(MPI_COMM_WORLD , &world_rank);
int world_size;
MPI_Comm_size(MPI_COMM_WORLD , &world_size);
125 // we use parallel computing to break up parameter space
int a_steps = 192;
int steps_per = a_steps/world_size;
double a_step = 0.05;
130
double am_original = a[0][0]; // the starting values of the male
competitive advantage
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double af_original = a[1][0]; // the starting values of the female
competitive advantage
int ipr = W_size + 2;
135
double * x_storage;
x_storage = (double *) calloc(a_steps*steps_per*repeatrun*ipr,
sizeof(double));
double max;
MPI_Status status;
140 MPI_Request request;
for(int am_val = world_rank*steps_per; am_val < (world_rank+1)*
steps_per; am_val++){
a[0][0] = (double)(am_original + a_step*am_val);
//printf("%i %f \n",world_rank ,a[0][0]);
145 for(int af_val = 0; af_val < a_steps; af_val++){ // more
general
a[1][0] = (double)(af_original + a_step*af_val);
max = maximum(1,-2);//maximum(1,a[0][0]-2);
if(a[1][0] <= a[0][0] && a[1][0] >= max){ // this
allows us to calculate the code in a band of
values. further speeds it up
for(int repeat = 0; repeat < repeatrun;
repeat++){
150
// initial guess
for (int i = 0; i < W_size; ++i){
x1[i] = randf();
}
155
organize(x1,alpha,d,num_island_types ,
territory_types_start ,
territory_types_end);
whilestop = 0;
iter = 0;
160 while (whilestop == 0){
v_func(Nval,v,d,alpha,a,c,B,p,
num_island_types ,
territory_types_start ,
territory_types_end);
row_index = 0;
165 for (int i = 0; i <
num_island_types; ++i){
for (int j =
territory_types_start[i
]; j <
territory_types_end[i];
++j){
// calculating the
values of the
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inclusive
fitness
expressions
W[row_index+0] =
Wx_d(Nval,v,d,
alpha,a,c,B,p
,0,i,j,
num_island_types
,
territory_types_start
,
territory_types_end
);
W[row_index+1] =
Wx_d(Nval,v,d,
alpha,a,c,B,p
,1,i,j,
num_island_types
,
territory_types_start
,
territory_types_end
);
170 W[row_index+2] =
Wx_alpha(Nval,v
,d,alpha,a,c,B,
p,i,j,
num_island_types
,
territory_types_start
,
territory_types_end
);
row_index += 3;
}
}
175
for(int i = 0; i < W_size; ++i){
// moves the traits
according to the value
of the inclusive
fitness expression
x2[i] = x1[i] + h*W[i];
180 // these lines of code are
used to fix values if
necessary
//x2[0] = 1.0; x2[1] = 0.5;
//x2[3] = 1.0; x2[4] = 0.5;
// we limit the traits
between 0 and 1
185 if (x2[i] > 0.99999999999){
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x2[i] =
0.99999999999;
}
else if (x2[i] <
0.00000000001){
x2[i] =
0.00000000001;
190 }
}
max_diff = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < W_size; ++i){
195 if (fabs(x2[i]-x1[i]) >
max_diff){
max_diff = fabs(x2[
i]-x1[i]);
}
}
200 // move around pointers
xtemp = x1;
x1 = x2;
x2 = xtemp;
205 // we move onto the next set of
life history parameters
if (max_diff < 1e-10){
whilestop = 1;
}
// each iteration we organize our
values of x1 into more usable
definitions
210 organize(x1,alpha,d,
num_island_types ,
territory_types_start ,
territory_types_end);
iter++;
}
// we place the necessary information into
storage matrices to send back using MPI
215 x_storage[(am_val-world_rank*steps_per)*
a_steps*repeatrun*ipr+af_val*repeatrun*
ipr+repeat*ipr+0] = a[0][0];
x_storage[(am_val-world_rank*steps_per)*
a_steps*repeatrun*ipr+af_val*repeatrun*
ipr+repeat*ipr+1] = a[1][0];
for(int i = 0; i < W_size; i++){
x_storage[(am_val-world_rank*
steps_per)*a_steps*repeatrun*
ipr+af_val*repeatrun*ipr+repeat
*ipr+i+2] = x1[i];
}
220
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}
}
}
}
225
//printf("%i finished\n",world_rank);
if(world_rank == 0){
FILE * file;
file = fopen("plas_fixD_dm0.5_df1.0_100_0.6_cm0.3_band2.txt
","w");
230
for (int j = 0; j < a_steps*steps_per*repeatrun; j++){
//fprintf(file,"%i ",-1);
fprintf(file,"%f %f ",x_storage[j*ipr + 0],
x_storage[j*ipr + 1]);
for(int i = 0; i < W_size; i++){
235 fprintf(file,"%f ",x_storage[j*ipr + i +
2]);
}
fprintf(file,"\n");
}
240 for (int process = 1; process < world_size; process++){
MPI_Irecv(&x_storage[0],a_steps*steps_per*repeatrun
*ipr,MPI_DOUBLE ,process ,0,MPI_COMM_WORLD ,&
request);
MPI_Wait(&request ,&status);
for (int j = 0; j < a_steps*steps_per*repeatrun; j
++){
245 //fprintf(file,"%i ",process);
fprintf(file,"%f %f ",x_storage[j*ipr + 0],
x_storage[j*ipr + 1]);
for(int i = 0; i < W_size; i++){
fprintf(file,"%f ",x_storage[j*ipr
+ i + 2]);
}
250 fprintf(file,"\n");
}
}
fclose(file);
}
255 else {
MPI_Isend(&x_storage[0],a_steps*steps_per*repeatrun*ipr,
MPI_DOUBLE ,0,0,MPI_COMM_WORLD ,&request);
MPI_Wait(&request ,&status);
}
260 // free memory
free(x1);
free(x2);
free(W);
free(territory_types_start);
265 free(territory_types_end);
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free(x_storage);
free(p);
free_2D_double(B,2);
free_2D_double(alpha ,2);
270 free_3D_double(d,2,2);
// check runtime
clock_t end;
end = clock();
275 double diff = static_cast <double >(end-begin);
if (world_rank == 0){
printf("\nTime Elapsed: %.2f seconds.\n", diff/
CLOCKS_PER_SEC);
}
280
// finalize mpi
MPI_Finalize();
}
D.2 dunn.h
1 #include "stdlib.h"
#include "stdio.h"
#include "time.h"
#include "string.h"
5 #include "math.h"
void calloc_2D_int(int *** A, int rows, int cols){
*A = (int **) calloc(rows,sizeof(int*));
for(int i = 0; i < rows; ++i)
10 (*A)[i]=(int*) calloc(cols,sizeof(int));
}
void calloc_2D_double(double *** A, int rows, int cols){
*A = (double **) calloc(rows,sizeof(double *));
15 for(int i = 0; i < rows; ++i)
(*A)[i]=(double *) calloc(cols,sizeof(double));
}
void calloc_3D_int(int **** A, int rows, int cols, int h){
20 *A = (int ***) calloc(rows,sizeof(int**));
for(int i = 0; i < rows; ++i) {
(*A)[i]=(int**) calloc(cols,sizeof(int*));
for(int j = 0; j < cols; ++j){
(*A)[i][j]=(int*) calloc(h,sizeof(int));
25 }
}
}
void calloc_3D_double(double **** A, int rows, int cols, int h){
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30 *A = (double ***) calloc(rows,sizeof(double**));
for(int i = 0; i < rows; ++i) {
(*A)[i]=(double**) calloc(cols,sizeof(double*));
for(int j = 0; j < cols; ++j){
(*A)[i][j]=(double*) calloc(h,sizeof(double));
35 }
}
}
void free_2D_int(int ** A, int rows){
40 for(int i = 0; i < rows; ++i)
free(A[i]);
free(A);
}
45 void free_2D_double(double ** A, int rows){
for(int i = 0; i < rows; ++i)
free(A[i]);
free(A);
}
50
void free_3D_int(int *** A, int rows, int cols){
for(int i = 0; i < rows; ++i){
for(int j = 0; j < cols; ++j){
free(A[i][j]);
55 }
free(A[i]);
}
free(A);
}
60
void free_3D_double(double *** A, int rows, int cols){
for(int i = 0; i < rows; ++i){
for(int j = 0; j < cols; ++j){
free(A[i][j]);
65 }
free(A[i]);
}
free(A);
}
70
void print_2D_int(int ** A, int rows, int cols){
for (int i = 0; i < rows; ++i){
for(int j = 0; j < cols; ++j){
printf("%i ",A[i][j]);
75 }
printf("\n");
}
}
80 void print_2D_int_tofile(int ** A, int rows, int cols, const char *
filename){
FILE * pfile;
pfile = fopen(filename,"w");
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for (int i = 0; i < rows; ++i){
for(int j = 0; j < cols; ++j){
85 fprintf(pfile,"%i ",A[i][j]);
}
fprintf(pfile,"\n");
}
fclose(pfile);
90 }
double randf (){
double ran;
ran = (double) rand()/(double)RAND_MAX;
95
return ran;
}
void transpose(double ** A, int size){
100 double temp;
for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i){
for (int j = i; j < size; ++j){
temp = A[i][j];
105 A[i][j] = A[j][i];
A[j][i] = temp;
}
}
}
110
void multiply(double * xnew, double ** A, double * x, int size){
for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i){
xnew[i] = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < size; ++j){
115 xnew[i] += A[i][j]*x[j];
}
}
}
120 void normalize(double * x, int size){
double sum=0;
for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i){
sum += x[i]*x[i];
125 }
sum = sqrt(sum);
//printf("sum print %f\n",sum);
for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i){
x[i] /= sum;
130 }
}
void o_normalize(double * x, int size){
double sum=0;
135
for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i){
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sum += x[i];
}
140 for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i){
x[i] /= sum;
}
}
145 double clip(double x, double clip_val){
double output;
if(x > clip_val){
output = clip_val;
150 }
else if (x < -clip_val){
output = -clip_val;
}
else {
155 output = x;
}
return output;
}
D.3 function Wx d.h
1 double Wx_d (double Nval, double *** v, double *** d, double ** alpha,
double a[][2], double c[][2], double ** B, double * p, int sex, int niq
, int ntq, int num_island_types , int * territory_types_start , int *
territory_types_end){
double output = 0.0;
// this function calculations the inclusive fitness effect of
dispersal
5 for (int j = territory_types_start[niq]; j < territory_types_end[
niq]; ++j){ // loop through territory quality
// reduced chance at winning a territory on natal island
output += -R(Nval,d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,niq)*B[j
][niq]*v[sex][j][niq]/N1(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,
num_island_types ,sex,niq);
for (int l = territory_types_start[niq]; l <
territory_types_end[niq]; ++l){ // loop through
territory quality
10 // territory of type l that would have been won by
dispersing offspring is won by an individual
from a territory of type j instead
output += k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,sex,j,
niq)*Rbar(Nval,d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types
,niq,ntq,j)*B[l][niq]*v[sex][l][niq]/N1(d,alpha
,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,sex,niq);
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}
}
15 for(int k = 0; k < num_island_types; ++k){ // loop through island
types
for (int t = territory_types_start[k]; t <
territory_types_end[k]; ++t){ // loop through territory
quality
// dispersing offspring wins a territory of type t
on an island of type k
output += (1.0-c[sex][ntq])*R(Nval,d,alpha,a,c,B,p,
num_island_types ,niq)*p[k]*B[t][k]*v[sex][t][k
]/N1(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,sex,k);
}
20 }
return output;
}
D.4 function Wx alpha.h
1 double Wx_alpha (double Nval, double *** v, double *** d, double ** alpha,
double a[][2], double c[][2], double ** B, double * p, int niq, int ntq
, int num_island_types , int * territory_types_start , int *
territory_types_end){
double output = 0.0;
// this function calculates the inclusive fitness effect of sex
allocation
5 for (int j = territory_types_start[niq]; j < territory_types_end[
niq]; ++j){ // loop through territory quality
// reduced chance at winning a territory on natal island
output += (1-d[0][ntq][niq])*a[0][ntq]*R(Nval,d,alpha,a,c,
B,p,num_island_types ,niq)*B[j][niq]*v[0][j][niq]/N1(d,
alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,0,niq);
output += -(1-d[1][ntq][niq])*a[1][ntq]*R(Nval,d,alpha,a,c,
B,p,num_island_types ,niq)*B[j][niq]*v[1][j][niq]/N1(d,
alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,1,niq);
10 for (int l = territory_types_start[niq]; l <
territory_types_end[niq]; ++l){ // loop through
territory quality
// territory of type l that would have been won by
dispersing offspring is won by an individual
from a territory of type j instead
output += -k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,0,j,
niq)*(1-d[0][ntq][niq])*a[0][ntq]*Rbar(Nval,d,
alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,niq,ntq,j)*B[l][
niq]*v[0][l][niq]/N1(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,
num_island_types ,0,niq);
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output += k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,1,j,
niq)*(1-d[1][ntq][niq])*a[1][ntq]*Rbar(Nval,d,
alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,niq,ntq,j)*B[l][
niq]*v[1][l][niq]/N1(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,
num_island_types ,1,niq);
}
15 }
for(int k = 0; k < num_island_types; ++k){ // loop through island
types
for (int t = territory_types_start[k]; t <
territory_types_end[k]; ++t){ // loop through territory
quality
// dispersing offspring wins a territory of type t
on an island of type k
20 output += d[0][ntq][niq]*(1.0-c[0][ntq])*a[0][ntq
]*R(Nval,d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,niq)*
p[k]*B[t][k]*v[0][t][k]/N1(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,
num_island_types ,0,k);
output += -d[1][ntq][niq]*(1.0-c[1][ntq])*a[1][ntq
]*R(Nval,d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,niq)*
p[k]*B[t][k]*v[1][t][k]/N1(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,
num_island_types ,1,k);
}
}
25 return output;
}
D.5 function k.h
1 double k (double *** d, double ** alpha, double a[][2], double c[][2],
double ** B, double * p, int num_island_types , int sex, int ntq, int
niq){
double output = 0.0;
double sa;
5 if (sex == 0){
sa = alpha[ntq][niq];
}
else if (sex == 1){
sa = 1.0-alpha[ntq][niq];
10 }
output = (1.0-d[sex][ntq][niq])*B[ntq][niq]*sa*a[sex][ntq]/N1(d,
alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,sex,niq);
return output;
15 }
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D.6 function kappa.h
1 double kappa (double *** d, double ** alpha, double a[][2], double c[][2],
double ** B, double * p, int num_island_types , int sex, int ntq, int
niq, int diq){
double output = 0.0;
double sa;
5 if (sex == 0){
sa = alpha[ntq][niq];
}
else if (sex == 1){
sa = 1.0-alpha[ntq][niq];
10 }
output = p[niq]*d[sex][ntq][niq]*(1.0-c[sex][ntq])*B[ntq][niq]*sa*a
[sex][ntq]/N1(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,sex,diq);
return output;
15 }
D.7 function N.h
1 double N1 (double *** d, double ** alpha, double a[][2], double c[][2],
double ** B, double * p, int num_island_types , int sex, int niq){
double output = 0.0;
double sa; // the sex allocation value
5 for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i){ // loop through all territory types
if (sex == 0){
sa = alpha[i][niq];
}
10 else if (sex == 1){
sa = 1.0-alpha[i][niq];
}
output += a[sex][i]*(1.0-d[sex][i][niq])*B[i][niq]*sa;
15
for (int k = 0; k < num_island_types; ++k){ // loop through
all island-types
if (sex == 0){
sa = alpha[i][k];
20 }
else if (sex == 1){
sa = 1.0-alpha[i][k];
}
D.8. function relatedness.h 85
25 // B[i][k] makes this zero when it should be (
number of territories of quality i)
// c is the cost of dispersal
// a is the competitive advantage
// p is fraction of type-k island
// d is dispersal
30 output += a[sex][i]*d[sex][i][k]*(1.0-c[sex][i])*p[
k]*B[i][k]*sa;
}
}
//output *= K; // we omit from numerator
35
return output;
}
D.8 function relatedness.h
1 double R (double Nval, double *** d, double ** alpha, double a[][2], double
c[][2], double ** B, double * p, int num_island_types , int niq){
double output=0;
double output_den;
double N = Nval;
5
double Bgn = B[0][niq]; // the number of good-quality breeders on a
type-n island
double Bbn = B[1][niq]; // the number of bad-quality breeders on a
type-n island
double kmg = k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,0,0,niq); //
probability male breeder was was a good-quality offspring in
previous generation (remains on natal territory)
10 double kfg = k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,1,0,niq); // same
as above, but female
double kmb = k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,0,1,niq); // male,
bad
double kfb = k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,1,1,niq); // female
, bad
15 if (Bgn == 0){ // if there are no good-quality breeders on an
island
output = 0.5*(N*kfb*kfb+2*N*kfb*kmb+N*kmb*kmb-kfb*kfb-2*kfb
*kmb-kmb*kmb-4*N)/(N*kfb*kfb+2*N*kfb*kmb+N*kmb*kmb-kfb*
kfb-kmb*kmb-4*N);
}
else if (Bbn == 0){ // if there are no bad-quality breeders on an
island
output = 0.5*(N*kfg*kfg+2*N*kfg*kmg+N*kmg*kmg-kfg*kfg-2*kfg
*kmg-kmg*kmg-4*N)/(N*kfg*kfg+2*N*kfg*kmg+N*kmg*kmg-kfg*
kfg-kmg*kmg-4*N);
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20 }
else { // if there is at least 1 good-quality breeder and at least
1 bad-quality breeder on an island
output = (Bbn*Bgn*kfb*kfb+2*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*kfg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*
kmb+2*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*kmg+Bbn*Bgn*kfg*kfg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kfg*kmb
+2*Bbn*Bgn*kfg*kmg+Bbn*Bgn*kmb*kmb+2*Bbn*Bgn*kmb*kmg+
Bbn*Bgn*kmg*kmg-Bbn*kfg*kfg-2*Bbn*kfg*kmg-Bbn*kmg*kmg-
Bgn*kfb*kfb-2*Bgn*kfb*kmb-Bgn*kmb*kmb-4*Bbn*Bgn);
output_den = (-Bbn*kfb*kfb*kfg*kmg+Bbn*kfb*kfg*kfg*kmb-Bbn*
kfb*kfg*kfg*kmg+Bbn*kfb*kmb*kmg*kmg+Bbn*kfb*kmg*kmg*kmg
+Bbn*kfg*kfg*kfg*kmb-Bbn*kfg*kmb*kmb*kmg-Bbn*kfg*kmb*
kmg*kmg+Bgn*kfb*kfb*kfb*kmg-Bgn*kfb*kfb*kfg*kmb+Bgn*kfb
*kfb*kfg*kmg-Bgn*kfb*kfg*kfg*kmb-Bgn*kfb*kmb*kmb*kmg-
Bgn*kfb*kmb*kmg*kmg+Bgn*kfg*kmb*kmb*kmb+Bgn*kfg*kmb*kmb
*kmg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*kfb+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*kfg+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*
kmb+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*kmg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kfg*kfg+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfg*
kmb+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfg*kmg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kmb*kmb+4*Bbn*Bgn*kmb*
kmg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kmg*kmg-2*Bbn*kfg*kfg-2*Bbn*kmg*kmg-2*Bgn
*kfb*kfb-2*Bgn*kmb*kmb-8*Bbn*Bgn);
25 output /= output_den;
}
return output;
}
30
double Rbar (double Nval, double *** d, double ** alpha, double a[][2],
double c[][2], double ** B, double * p, int num_island_types , int niq,
int ntq, int dtq){
// dtq is the offspring
// ntq is the breeder
double output=0;
35 double output_den;
double N = Nval;
double Bgn = B[0][niq]; // number of good-quality breeders on a
type-n island
double Bbn = B[1][niq]; // number of bad-quality breeders on a type
-n island
40
double kmg = k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,0,0,niq); //
probability male breeder was was a good-quality offspring in
previous generation (remains on natal territory)
double kfg = k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,1,0,niq); // same
as above, but female
double kmb = k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,0,1,niq); // male,
bad
45 double kfb = k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,num_island_types ,1,1,niq); // female
, bad
if (Bgn == 0){ // if there are no good-quality breeders
output = -2/(N*kfb*kfb+2*N*kfb*kmb+N*kmb*kmb-kfb*kfb-kmb*
kmb-4*N);
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}
50 else if (Bbn == 0){ // if there are no bad-quality breeders
output = -2/(N*kfg*kfg+2*N*kfg*kmg+N*kmg*kmg-kfg*kfg-kmg*
kmg-4*N);
}
else {
if (ntq == 0 && ntq == dtq){ // if breeder and random
offspring are both good-quality
55 output = (Bbn*kfb*kfb+2*Bbn*kfb*kfg+2*Bbn*kfb*kmb
+2*Bbn*kfb*kmg+2*Bbn*kfg*kmb+Bbn*kmb*kmb+2*Bbn*
kmb*kmg-Bgn*kfb*kfb-2*Bgn*kfb*kmb-Bgn*kmb*kmb
-4*Bbn);
}
else if (ntq == 1 && ntq == dtq){ // if breeder and random
offspring are both bad-quality
output = -(Bbn*kfg*kfg+2*Bbn*kfg*kmg+Bbn*kmg*kmg-2*
Bgn*kfb*kfg-2*Bgn*kfb*kmg-Bgn*kfg*kfg-2*Bgn*kfg
*kmb-2*Bgn*kfg*kmg-2*Bgn*kmb*kmg-Bgn*kmg*kmg+4*
Bgn);
}
60 else { // if breeder and random offspring are different
quality
output = -(Bbn*kfg*kfg+2*Bbn*kfg*kmg+Bbn*kmg*kmg+
Bgn*kfb*kfb+2*Bgn*kfb*kmb+Bgn*kmb*kmb);
}
output_den = (-Bbn*kfb*kfb*kfg*kmg+Bbn*kfb*kfg*kfg*kmb-Bbn*
kfb*kfg*kfg*kmg+Bbn*kfb*kmb*kmg*kmg+Bbn*kfb*kmg*kmg*kmg
+Bbn*kfg*kfg*kfg*kmb-Bbn*kfg*kmb*kmb*kmg-Bbn*kfg*kmb*
kmg*kmg+Bgn*kfb*kfb*kfb*kmg-Bgn*kfb*kfb*kfg*kmb+Bgn*kfb
*kfb*kfg*kmg-Bgn*kfb*kfg*kfg*kmb-Bgn*kfb*kmb*kmb*kmg-
Bgn*kfb*kmb*kmg*kmg+Bgn*kfg*kmb*kmb*kmb+Bgn*kfg*kmb*kmb
*kmg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*kfb+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*kfg+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*
kmb+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfb*kmg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kfg*kfg+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfg*
kmb+4*Bbn*Bgn*kfg*kmg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kmb*kmb+4*Bbn*Bgn*kmb*
kmg+2*Bbn*Bgn*kmg*kmg-2*Bbn*kfg*kfg-2*Bbn*kmg*kmg-2*Bgn
*kfb*kfb-2*Bgn*kmb*kmb-8*Bbn*Bgn);
65 output /= output_den;
}
return output;
}
D.9 function v.h
1 void v_func (double Nval, double *** v, double *** d, double ** alpha,
double a[][2], double c[][2], double ** B, double * p, int
num_island_types , int * territory_types_start , int *
territory_types_end){
int size = 0;
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double max_diff;
5 double rowsum = 0;
int N_int = static_cast <int>(Nval);
for (int i = 0; i < num_island_types; ++i){
if (B[0][i] == 0 || B[0][i] == N_int){
10 size += 2;
}
else {
size += 4;
}
15 }
int poscount = 0, islcount = 0;
int ** position;
calloc_2D_int(&position ,2,size); // 0 for islandcount , 1 for
territory quality
20
// used to automate which terms are necessary for the A matrix
for (int i = 0; i < num_island_types; ++i){
if (B[0][i] == 0){ // all bad
position[0][poscount] = islcount;
25 position[0][poscount+1] = islcount;
position[1][poscount] = 1;
position[1][poscount+1] = 1;
poscount+=2;
islcount++;
30 }
else if (B[1][i] == 0){ // all good
position[0][poscount] = islcount;
position[0][poscount+1] = islcount;
position[1][poscount] = 0;
35 position[1][poscount+1] = 0;
poscount+=2;
islcount++;
}
else {
40 position[0][poscount] = islcount;
position[0][poscount+1] = islcount;
position[0][poscount+2] = islcount;
position[0][poscount+3] = islcount;
position[1][poscount] = 0;
45 position[1][poscount+1] = 0;
position[1][poscount+2] = 1;
position[1][poscount+3] = 1;
poscount+=4;
islcount++;
50 }
}
double ** A; // stores the probability a gene now in row was in
column in the previous generation
calloc_2D_double(&A,size,size);
55
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// rows i%2 = 0 are male, i%2 = 1 are female
// good then bad
// v_mg, v_fg, v_mb, v_fb, then moves to next island
for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i){
60 for (int j = 0; j < size; ++j){
if (position[0][i] == position[0][j]){
A[i][j] += 0.5*k(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,
num_island_types ,i%2,position[1][j],
position[0][i]); // natal island
requirement
}
A[i][j] += 0.5*kappa(d,alpha,a,c,B,p,
num_island_types ,i%2,position[1][j],position
[0][j],position[0][i]);
65 }
}
double * x;
x = (double *) calloc(size,sizeof(double));
70 for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i){
x[i] = randf(); // initial guess at x
}
double * xnew;
75 xnew = (double *) calloc(size,sizeof(double));
double * temp;
transpose(A,size);
80
double sum;
for (int j = 0; j < size; j++){
sum = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < size; i++){
85 sum += A[i][j];
}
if((1.0-sum) > 1e-7){
printf("Sum is not 1\n");
}
90 }
int whilestop = 0;
int flag = 0, iter = 0;
while (whilestop == 0){
95 multiply(xnew,A,x,size);
o_normalize(xnew,size);
max_diff = 0;
100 for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i){
if (fabs(xnew[i]-x[i]) > max_diff){
max_diff = fabs(xnew[i]-x[i]);
}
}
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105
if (max_diff < 1e-14){ // if the change in our eigenvector
is below a tolerance we move out of this loop
whilestop = 1;
}
110 iter++;
if (iter > 1000 && flag == 0){
flag = 1;
}
115 temp = x;
x = xnew;
xnew = temp;
}
120
// organizes and divides by u
int row_counter = 0;
// this function organizes a vector of class reproductive values, x
, into individual reproductive values, v
for (int i = 0; i < num_island_types; ++i){
125 for (int j = territory_types_start[i]; j <
territory_types_end[i]; ++j){
v[0][j][i] = x[row_counter]/(p[i]*B[j][i]/Nval); //
we divide by class frequencies so we have
individual reproductive values
v[1][j][i] = x[row_counter+1]/(p[i]*B[j][i]/Nval);
row_counter += 2;
130 }
}
free_2D_int(position ,2);
free_2D_double(A,size);
135 free(x);
free(xnew);
}
D.10 function organize.h
1 void organize (double * x, double ** alpha, double *** d, int
num_island_types , int * territory_types_start , int *
territory_types_end){
int row_counter = 0;
// this function turns a row vector of trait values, x, into ones
that are more easy to use in code, alpha and d
for (int i = 0; i < num_island_types; ++i){
5 for (int j = territory_types_start[i]; j <
territory_types_end[i]; ++j){
d[0][j][i] = x[row_counter];
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d[1][j][i] = x[row_counter+1];
alpha[j][i] = x[row_counter+2];
10 row_counter += 3;
}
}
}
Appendix E
Nonzero relatedness among islandmates of
differing quality
In this appendix we present a generalized version of our model along with some preliminary
results. We generalize the model presented in Chapter 2 by allowing islands to consist of
of both good- and bad-quality territories. As before, breeder quality is inhered from territory
quality (i.e., good-quality breeders are on good-quality territories and bad-quality breeders
are on bad-quality territories), and offspring quality is derived from their parent (i.e., good-
quality breeders give birth to good-quality offspring). We emphasize that offspring quality
does not necessarily translate into breeder quality. This means that a good-quality offspring
could become a bad-quality breeder, and vice versa.
We again consider a population made up of diploid dioecious individuals with nonoverlap-
ping generations. The model population is found in a habitat made up of a very large number
of islands. Each island is subdivided into N breeding territories, which are either of good or
bad quality. We let n = 0, ...,N denote the number of good-quality territories on a given island
(N−n is the number of bad-quality territories on that same island). We refer to an island with n
good-quality territories as a type-n island. Additionally, we let pn denote the fraction of islands
with n good-quality territories, referred to as a type-n island, where pn remains constant over
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time.
E.1 Life cycle
Here we present a life cycle that is very similar to the one presented in Chapter 2, but has a
few minor alterations. The life cycle consists of a series of life-history events that occur in the
following order:
Birth
Each breeding pair produces K sons and K daughters, where K is very large.
Parental care
A quality-i breeding pair on a type-n island (i.e., islands with n good-quality breeders) have
a fixed amount of resource to devote to offspring. They allocate the fraction αi,n to sons and
1−αi,n to daughters. Leaving them with Kαi,n quality-i sons and K(1−αi,n) quality-i daughters.
We assume that allocation decisions are controlled by the genotype of the female member of
the breeding pair (i.e., we assume maternal control). It is convenient to assume that investment
all breeding pairs in the population die. At this point, only offspring remain.
Dispersal
Quality-i offspring born on a type-n island disperse independently, with probability ds,i,n, where
s = m (male), f (female). We assume that dispersal is costly. The cost associated with disper-
sal for males and females is cm and c f , respectively. This means that only fraction 1 − cs of
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sex-s dispersers survive to the next stage in the life history. Individuals who do not disperse do
not pay a cost and survive to the next stage in the life history with probability equal to unity
(i.e., equals one).
Male-Male Competition
Following the dispersal phase, male offspring compete for mates. The competitive ability of a
good-quality male offspring is am,g and the competitive ability of a bad-quality male offspring
is am,b, and we often focus on the ratio qm = am,g/am,b ≥ 1, which we call the male competition
quotient (MCQ). The total amount of male competitive effort on a type-n island is denoted by
Nm,n and is calculated in Appendix A.
Female-Female Competition
Female offspring compete for breeding territories. The competitive ability of a good-quality
female offspring is a f ,g and the competitive ability of a bad-quality female offspring is a f ,b, and
we often focus on the ratio q f = a f ,g/a f ,b ≥ 1, which we call the female competition quotient
(FCQ). The total amount of female competitive effort on a type-n island is denoted by N f ,n and
is calculated in Appendix A.
E.2 Evolution of sex allocation
To apply the inclusive-fitness approach to the evolution of sex allocation we fix attention on
a quality-i breeding female on a type-n island. We assume that this individual, and only this
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individual, increases its allocation strategy, αi,n, by a very small amount (Taylor, 1989). In
Appendix A, we use a modeling heuristic developed by (Taylor and Frank, 1996) to show the
resulting changes in the inclusive fitness of the focal individual, holding all other sex allocation
and dispersal traits in the population fixed, can be expressed as
∆Wαs,i,n ∝
∑
j
(1 − dm,i,n)am,i
Nm,n
B j,nvm, j,nRi,n − (1 − d f ,i,n)a f ,iN f ,n B j,nv f , j,nRi,n︸                                                                       ︷︷                                                                       ︸
sex-allocation term A
+
∑
t,k
pk
dm,i,n(1 − cm)am,i
Nm,k
Bt,kvm,t,kRi,n − pk d f ,i,n(1 − c f )a f ,iN f ,k Bt,kv f ,t,kRi,n︸                                                                                  ︷︷                                                                                  ︸
sex-allocation term B
+
∑
j,l
−km,l,n (1 − dm,i,n)am,iNm,n B j,nvm, j,nR¯i,l,n︸                                          ︷︷                                          ︸
sex-allocation term C
+
∑
j,l
k f ,l,n
(1 − d f ,i,n)a f ,i
N f ,n
B j,nv f , j,nR¯i,l,n︸                                      ︷︷                                      ︸
sex-allocation term D

,
(E.1)
where Bi,n is the number of quality-i breeders on a type-n island, vs,i,n is the individual repro-
ductive value of a sex-s quality-i breeder on a type-n island, ks,i,n is the probability a sex-s
quality-i offspring on a type-n island would have won a breeding opportunity (s = m) or terri-
tory (s = f ), Ri,n is the relatedness between a quality-i breeder on a type-n island and their own
offspring, and R¯i, j,n is the relatedness between a quality-i breeder and quality- j offspring chosen
uniformly at random on a type-n island. In Appendix C, we carry out a biological argument to
verify the above equation.
The inclusive-fitness change in 2.1 can be broken down into four terms. The first term
(sex-allocation term A) is the sum of direct inclusive-fitness gains through non-dispersing sons
on one hand, and direct inclusive-fitness losses through non-dispersing daughters. The sec-
ond term (sex-allocation term B) is the difference of direct inclusive-fitness gains through
dispersing sons on one hand, and direct inclusive-fitness losses through dispersing daugh-
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ters. Sex-allocation terms A and B show that the focal breeding female faces a trade off be-
tween the production of sons and the production of daughters. The third term (sex-allocation
term C) represents indirect inclusive-fitness losses due to increased competition for mates that
comes from non-dispersing sons. The fourth term (sex-allocation term D) represents indirect
inclusive-fitness gains due to decreased competition for breeding territories that comes from
non-dispersing daughters.
Sex allocation terms A through D, together, describe the overall inclusive-fitness change of
a quality-i breeding female on a type-n island slightly increasing its allocation strategy. When
∆Wαi,n is positive (resp. negative), it is beneficial for the breeding female to slightly increase
(resp. decrease) its current allocation strategy.
E.3 Evolution of dispersal
To apply the inclusive-fitness approach to the evolution of dispersal we fix attention on a sex-s
quality-i offspring on a type-n island. We assume that this individual, and only this individual,
increases its probability of dispersal, ds,i,n, by a very small amount (Taylor, 1989). In Appendix
A, we use a modeling heuristic developed by (Taylor and Frank, 1996) to show the resulting
changes in the inclusive fitness of the focal individual, holding all other sex allocation and
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dispersal traits in the population fixed, can be expressed as
∆Wds,i,n ∝ −
∑
j
1
Nm,n
B j,nRi,nvs, j,n︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
dispersal term A
+ (1 − cs)
∑
t,k
pk
1
Ns,k
Bt,kRi,nvs,t,k︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
dispersal term B
+
∑
j,l
ks,l,n
1
Ns,n
B j,nR¯i,l,nvs, j,n︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
dispersal term C

. (E.2)
In Appendix C, we carry out a biological argument to verify the above equation.
The inclusive-fitness change for dispersal (equation 2.2) can be broken down into three
terms. The first term (dispersal term A) is a direct inclusive-fitness loss through non-dispersing
sex-s offspring. The second term (dispersal term B) is a direct inclusive-fitness through dis-
persing sex-s offspring. The third term (dispersal term C) is a indirect inclusive-fitness gain
due to decreased competition for mates or decreased competition for breeding territories when
s = m and s = f , respectively.
Dispersal terms A through C, together, describe the overall inclusive-fitness change of a
sex-s quality-i offspring on a type-n island that slightly increases its dispersal strategy. When
∆Wds,i,n is positive (resp. negative), it is beneficial for the offspring to slightly increase (resp.
decrease) its current dispersal strategy.
E.3.1 Reiterating the simple allocation rule (SAR)
Recall that the SAR works when the average good-quality breeder invests more resources in
sons and the average bad-quality breeder invests more resources in daughters when sons receive
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a greater benefit for being a good-quality offspring (qm > q f ). Conversely, the SAR works
when the average good-quality breeder invests more resources in daughters and the average
bad-quality breeder invests more resources in sons when daughters receive a greater benefit for
being a good-quality offspring (q f > qm). We define the average allocation strategy used by a
quality-i breeder as αˆi. Mathematically,
Simple rule works:

qm > q f implies αˆg >
1
2
> αˆb
qm < q f implies αˆg <
1
2
< αˆb
 ,
where
αˆi =
∑
n Bi,npnαi,n∑
n Bi,npn
.
E.4 Preliminary results
We have some results when individuals of different quality can be related, but are still unsure of
the presentation and rationale. We use the code built in Appendix D, which utilizes equations
(E.1) and (E.2) to find equilibrium sex-allocation and dispersal strategies.
In this analysis we look at populations with two island types. The first type has n good-
quality territories and the second type has N−n good-quality territories. We recover the results
presented in Chapter 2 when we set n = N.
We define the average quality in the population as γ = pnBg,n/N + (1 − pn)Bg,N−n/N. If
γ = 1 it means the population consists entirely of good-quality territories and if γ = 0 it means
that the population consists entirely of bad-quality territories.
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E.4.1 Allowing dispersal to evolve improves the predictive ability of the
SAR
As was shown in Chapter 2, the SAR always works when sex allocation and sex-specific
dispersal coevolve and the cost of dispersal is the same for males and females (cm = c f ). When
dispersal is fixed (i.e., not allowed to evolve) the SAR can fail for large regions of parameter
space. Based on this finding, we can conclude that the predictive ability of the SAR is improved
when sex allocation and sex-specific dispersal coevolve, regardless of island structure.
E.4.2 Reducing the differences in sex-specific costs of dispersal improves
the predictive ability of the SAR
As was found in Chapter 2, we see that when within-group variation in quality is nonzero,
reducing the difference in sex-specific costs of dispersal makes the SAR a better predictor of
allocation decisions (Figure E.1). As before, we argue that reducing the asymmetry in the sex-
specific dispersal costs causes asymmetries due to competitive quotients to be magnified, and
in turn, cause the SAR to be a better predictor of allocation decisions.
E.4.3 Increasing island size makes the SAR a better predictor of alloca-
tion decisions
Unlike the results in Chapter 2, we found that increasing the island size, N, makes the SAR
a better predictor of allocation decisions (Figure E.2). This may be due to the fact that the
reductions in relatedness are not as large.
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Figure E.1: Reducing the difference sex-specific dispersal costs improves the performance of
the SAR. In this figure we set γ = 0.7, the amount of within-group variation in territory quality
to be 0.16, cm = 0.3, and N = 10. (a) In this panel, we set c f = 0.1. In this case, the region
where the SAR fails is outlined by a purple curve. (b) In this panel, we set c f = 0.2. In this
case, the region where the SAR fails is outlined by a green curve. (c) In this panel, we overlay
panels a) and b).
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(b) N = 20
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Figure E.2: Increasing the island size improves the performance of the SAR. In this figure we
set γ = 0.7, the amount of within-group variation in territory quality to be 0.16, cm = 0.3,
c f = 0.1, and varied the island size, N. (a) In this panel, we set N = 10. In this case, the region
where the SAR fails is outlined by a purple curve. (b) In this panel, we set N = 20. In this
case, the region where the SAR fails is outlined by a green curve. (c) In this panel, we overlay
panels a) and b).
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Figure E.3: The SAR can become invariant to changes in the competitive quotient of the sex
with higher costs of dispersal. In this figure, we demonstrate that the SAR becomes invariant
to the MCQ (qm). In this figure, we set the amount of within-group variation in territory quality
to be 0.16, cm = 0.3, c f = 0.1, and N = 10.
E.4.4 The predictive ability of the SAR can become invariant to compet-
itive quotients
In Chapter 2, we find that the point of failure for the SAR can become invariant to the com-
petitive quotient of the sex with a higher cost of dispersal. This is also the case when we
have nonzero within-group variation in territory quality on an island (Figure E.3). Mathemati-
cally, when qs is sufficiently large, the success or failure of the SAR only depends on qs′ when
cs > cs′ .
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(b) within-group variation = 0.16
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(c) within-group variation = 0.21
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Figure E.4: The success or failure of the SAR depends critically on both the global frequency
of good-quality territories, γ, and the amount of within-group variation in territory quality on
an island. For all panels in this figure we set cm = 0.3, c f = 0.1, N = 10. We use the values
γ = 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and the colour of each curve remains consistent for each panel. (a)
The amount of within-group variation in territory quality on an island is 0.09. Notice that the
SAR can fail for only a small region when q f > qm. (b) The amount of within-group variation
in territory quality on an island is 0.16. Notice that the SAR cannot fail when q f > qm. (c) The
amount of within-group variation in territory quality on an island is 0.21. Notice that the SAR
cannot fail when q f > qm.
E.4.5 Increasing the average quality in the population has a variable ef-
fect on the predictive ability of the SAR
We find that increasing global frequency of good-quality territories, γ, has a variable effect on
the predictive strength of the SAR. When cs > cs′ and qs > qs′ , increasing γ causes the SAR to
be a better (resp. worse) predictor of allocation decisions when qs is low (resp. high) (Figure
E.4c).
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E.4.6 Increasing the amount of within-group variation in territory qual-
ity has a variable effect on the predictive ability of the SAR
We find that as the amount of within-group variation in territory quality on an island increases,
the SAR fails less often when qs < qs′ and cs > cs′ . We also find that when qs > qs′ and
cs > cs′ the SAR becomes invariant to the competitive of the sex with higher dispersal costs
more quickly. Both of these results are demonstrated in Figure E.4.
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